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ABSTRACT
In exchange for granting inventors a limited monopoly, the patent laws require inventors to
"enable" the public to make and use their invention. In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medra4, Inc.,
Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., and Sitrick v. Dream works,
L.L.C., the Federal Circuit made it far easier to show that patents are invalid based on lack of
enablement in the predictable arts. These decisions rely on the enablement doctrine to invalidate
claims that appear to be far broader in scope than what the written description of the patents
suggests.
This Article: (1) explains the rationale underlying the enablement doctrine; (2) traces how the
doctrine has evolved into various inconsistent tests; (3) analyzes the three new decisions; and (4)
rejects the "full scope" rule that these decisions advance. Specifically, this Article argues that in the
predictable arts, the full scope rule is extremely difficult to apply and will cause unnecessary
litigation. Moreover, the enablement doctrine is a blunt instrument that rewards unintended
beneficiaries and cannot consider all the facts important to an overbreadth analysis. Therefore, the
enablement doctrine is not well suited to addressing the problem of generic or overbroad claims.
This Article concludes that the Federal Circuit should take a step back from the full scope rule
and return to the principles set forth in its earlier decisions. Finally, this Article suggests that if the
Court truly wishes to address overbroad or generic claims, the doctrines of claim construction and
the reverse doctrine of equivalents are better vehicles for accomplishing that goal.
0 @ 2009, Bernard Chao. Bernard Chao is a partner specializing in patent law with the firm of Chao Hadidi Stark &
Barker LLP in Menlo Park, California. He obtained his J.D. from the School of Law at Duke University.
The author would like to give special thanks to Fred Hadidi for being the primary sounding board for this article. Ann Pease,
Linda Baxley, and Brian Clarke also deserve recognition for their insightful comments. The opinions expressed in this article are
the author's alone and should not be attributed to Chao Hadidi Stark & Barker LLP or its clients.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of the patent system is to promote innovation without stifling competition.'
Patents encourage innovation by granting inventors a monopoly to make, use, and sell the
patented technology for a limited term.' However, when patent rights become too strong,
competition can be harmed.
For several years, the predominant view has been that the scales have tipped too far in favor of
patent holders.3 In response, the courts have been reining in patent holders' rights in several
different ways. For example, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court clarified the
obviousness standard, making it easier to combine references and invalidate patents. ' In eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court overruled years of Federal Circuit precedent that
granted permanent injunctions to virtually all prevailing plaintiffs. ' Under the new standard
announced in eBay, courts must use the same four-factor test that they use for other types of cases.
This has resulted in fewer permanent injunctions and reduced the value of patents.' The Federal
Circuit has also limited patent holders' rights in new ways. For example, in In re Seagate, the
Federal Circuit made it more difficult for patent holders to prove willful infringement by adopting
a recklessness standard to replace the previous standard, which was more akin to negligence
This anti-patent trend has now touched yet another doctrine. Previously, when confronted with
broad or generic claims, defendants raised two primary arguments: 1) the claims should be
construed narrowly; and 2) the claims are invalid based on the prior art. Three recent Federal
Circuit decisions-Liebel-larsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,8 Automotive Technologies International, Inc v.
BMW of North America, Inc.,9 and Sitrick v. Dreamwork, L.L.C.'-have expanded the enablement
defense and provided defendants with another tool to challenge claims that have a far broader
scope than might be expected from reading the patent's specification.
These decisions rely upon and then extend principles developed in one line of enablement
decisions. They ignore, however, another line of cases that has evolved separately. This second line
of cases simplified the enablement standard so that a specification that enables any embodiment
satisfies the enablement requirement notwithstanding the breadth of the claims. Liebel-Flarsheim,
Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick take the existing split in Federal Circuit law and pry it even
further open. The three recent decisions held claims invalid because the descriptions did not enable
the full scope of the claimed invention. The "full scope" rule, as applied in these decisions, suggests
that if a patent fails to enable any embodiment that falls within the scope of the claim, the claim is
invalid.
' See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 1-4 (2003) [hereinafter INNOVATION] (discussing goals of patent policy), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2009) (working
paper at 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273293) ("In recent years, influential scholars, practicing lawyers, government
officials, government commissions, enforcement agencies, and courts have all identified the phenomenon of 'patent holdup' as a
serious problem that may require various reforms to both patent and antitrust law.' (footnotes omitted)), see also Douglas
Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Laws Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 n.5 (2007) ("Calls for patent
reform have echoed loudly over the past several years, with industry organizations, patent scholars, and government agencies all
publicly announcing that the patent system is broken and that the PTO in particular is letting a large number of undeserving
patents be issued.").
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
6 See Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 543 (2008).
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
9 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
"0 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
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These results would not have been surprising if the patents were found in the unpredictable
arts (e.g. chemical or biotechnology). In those fields, the law has long required the specification to
provide a higher level of detail to satisfy the enablement requirement." However, the patents in
Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick relate to technology that would normally be
considered to fall within the predictable arts. These decisions operate under the pretense that they
are simply applying existing enablement law. This Article argues that the cases represent a new
direction. Before the entire Federal Circuit adopts this approach, it should consider whether
applying the full scope rule in the predictable arts is the best course. To aid in that analysis, this
Article reevaluates the enablement doctrine and attempts to identify potential problems with the
full scope rule.
Part II of this Article reviews the case law that existed prior to Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive
Technologies, and Sitrick and discusses the original split. Part III describes the three recent
enablement decisions and how they differ from previous case law. Part IV summarizes the current
split. Part V critically analyzes whether the new full scope rule is appropriate. Specifically, this
Article explains that the goal of the full scope rule is to address overbroad claims and why the
enablement doctrine is not particularly well suited to address that problem. Moreover, because
innovation in the predictable arts tends to be incremental, the full scope rule is extremely difficult
to apply. This may allow zealous defendants to raise an enablement defense in far too many
lawsuits.
Finally, Part VI suggests the following: 1) the Federal Circuit should stop focusing on the full
scope of a claim and return to weighing traditional factual considerations; and 2) to the extent that
the Federal Circuit is attempting to address overbroad claims, it should consider other doctrines
whose remedies are better suited for reining in broad patents.
II. ENABLEMENT LAW, BACKGROUND
A. Section 112: Enablement
The statutory basis of the enablement requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which states
that the specification shall describe "the manner and process of making and using [the invention],
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the [invention] ....
This requirement is satisfied when a person of ordinary skill in the art, after reading the
specification, could practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation.3 The issue of
enablement is "a question of law based on underlying facts."
4
B. The Predictability Issue
Historically, courts have treated inventions involving the predictable arts differently from
those in the unpredictable arts. In In re Fisher, the Court of Customs and Patent Claims explained
the rationale underlying this distinction:
In cases involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements, a single
embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense that, once imagined, other
embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics
predicted by resort to known scientific laws. In cases involving unpredictable factors, such
nSee infra note 15 and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Enablement ... is not precluded
even if some experimentation is necessary, although the amount of experimentation needed must not be unduly extensive ...
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement obviously
varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved.'
Importantly, Fisher does not describe a different standard for different technologies. Rather, the
decision explains why, in practice, a disclosure of a single embodiment in the predictable arts may
enable broad claims. In cases where the technology is predictable, disclosing a single embodiment
will often allow persons of skill in the art to practice other embodiments. As the technology
becomes less predictable, persons of skill in the art may not understand how to practice other
embodiments without additional insights.
In In re Wands, the Federal Circuit incorporated the issue of "predictability" into its analysis of
the enablement standard.6 Although the term "undue experimentation" does not appear in the
statute, "it is well established that enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art
to make and use the invention without undue experimentation."' The Federal Circuit stated that
"[w]hether undue experimentation is needed is not a single, simple factual determination, but
rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations."8 The Court then listed a
number of factors to be considered:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention,
(5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or
unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.9
Thus, under Wands, the enablement standard is a nuanced test that depends on a number of
different factors. As our analysis reveals, many subsequent decisions have simplified that test and
focused merely on the issue of predictability.
In re Vaeck suggests that, regardless of whether a case falls within the predictable or
unpredictable arts, the specific technology must still be examined. 20 In Vaeck, the claimed
invention was directed to the production of proteins that are toxic to mosquito and black fly
larvae. 21 The protein was produced by hosting them in cyanobacteria.22 Although the claims at
issue were directed to cyanobacteria generally, the specification mentioned only nine genera of
cyanobacteria and described only one particular species of cyanobacteria in the working example.23
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office") rejected the claims for lack of
enablement. On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the "molecular biology of [cyanobacateria]
has only recently become the subject of intensive investigation and this work is limited to a few
genera. Therefore the level of unpredictability ... is high." 24 The Federal Circuit went on to affirm
the enablement rejection, explaining that "[t]here is no reasonable correlation between the narrow
disclosure in appellants' specification and the broad scope of protection sought in the claims
encompassing gene expression in any and all cyanobacteria."
2
1
" 427 F.2d at 839; see also Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that, in the
context of an "unpredictable technology in the early stages of development, an enabling description in the specification must
provide those skilled in the art with a specific and useful teaching").
" 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed Cir. 1988).
17 Id (citing Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1384 and Atlas Powder Co. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
16 Id
19 Id. (citing In re Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 547 (B.P.A.I. 1986)).
20 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
21 Id. at 489.
22 id.
21 Id. at 495 (stating that there are approximately 150 genera of cyanobacteria).
24 Id. at 493.
21 Id. at 495.
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However, the Court cautioned against applying its holding to all patent applications in the
"unpredictable" arts:
[W]e do not imply that patent applicants in art areas currently denominated as"unpredictable" must never be allowed generic claims encompassing more than the
particular species disclosed in their specification. It is well settled that patent applicants are
not required to disclose every species encompassed by their claims, even in an
unpredictable art.26
Thus, although the Federal Circuit found that a specification describing a single embodiment
was insufficient to enable the broad claims in Vaeck, the decision also suggested that such a
disclosure could be sufficient in other circumstances-even in the unpredictable arts.2
C. In re Wright and the Full Scope of a Claim
From an analytical perspective, In re Wright8 is not a particularly noteworthy case. It is a
decision in the unpredictable arts that uses the same kind of analysis as Vaeck to arrive at a similar
result. However, from a historical perspective, Wright is important because it appears to be the first
decision to characterize § 112 as requiring enablement of the 'full scope of the claimed invention. "29
In Wright, the patent application described the production of a recombinant vaccine that
confers immunity in chickens against the RNA tumor virus known as Prague Avian Sarcoma Virus.
The application contained claims directed to the specific process and vaccine disclosed in the
specification.30 The application, however, also sought claims for a much broader scope of
protection, including claims that read "on vaccines against all pathogenic RNA viruses."3' The
Patent Office rejected the broader claims on the grounds that the specification did not enable the
full scope of the claims.
In reviewing the Patent Office's decision, the Federal Circuit described the enablement
requirement: "Although not explicitly stated in section 112, to be enabling, the specification of a
patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed
invention without 'undue experimentation. "'32
The decision cited Vaeck, Wands, and Fisher. However, none of these decisions use the term
"full scope," nor does Wright actually focus on that language in its analysis. Rather the Federal
Circuit upheld the enablement rejection based on a straightforward application of the enablement
requirement. The decision explained that, 'Wright has failed to establish by evidence or arguments
that ... a skilled scientist would have believed reasonably that Wright's success with a particular
strain of an avian RNA virus could be extrapolated with a reasonable expectation of success to
other avian RNA viruses."33 Predictability was an important factor in the outcome. The Court
noted that the claims at issue encompassed AIDS vaccines and that, "because of the high degree of
genetic, antigenic variations in such viruses, no one ha[d] yet ... developed a generally successful
26 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502-03 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
21 Id. See e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The claims at issue were drawn to the
genus of antibodies that bind to the claimed antigen. The defendant, Cellpro, argued that the specification only disclosed the
method of producing the anti-My-10 antibody and thus did not enable the claims that covered the entire genus. Id. at 1359. The
Court rejected the enablement defense in part based on an expert declaration stating that the expert was able to produce six
antibodies using the disclosed method. Id. at 1361.
28 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
29 Id at 1561 (emphasis added).
SId. at 1559.
Id. at 1560 (emphasis in original).
12 Id. at 1561 (emphasis added) (citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); and In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ).
- Id at 1564.
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AIDS virus vaccine."34 In sum, the Federal Circuit found that the broad claims of an unpredictable
technology were not enabled even though the specification had clearly enabled one mbodiment.
This unremarkable decision serves as the foundation of the analysis for Liebel-Flarsheim,
Automotive Technologies and Sitrick because of the particular way it characterized the enablement
standard. Although many decisions cite Wright for the proposition that the "full scope of the
claims" must be enabled,35 those cases do not focus on the phrase in the same manner as Liebel-
Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies and Sitrick.
D. The Bright Line Test: Enabling a Single Embodiment is Sufficient
As shown above, describing one embodiment is often insufficient to enable broad claims in the
unpredictable arts. In contrast, decisions in the predictable arts have found that describing one
embodiment satisfies the enablement requirement even when the claims are much broader. In
contrast to Fisher, Wands, and Vaeck, these decisions appear to apply a bright line rule suggesting
that describing a single embodiment is always sufficient to satisfy the enablement requirement.
In Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc, the ion laser patents stressed the importance of attaching
two components that would have to endure repeated heat cycles.3 That feature was evident in the
claims at issue which required a "means for attaching" or essentially the same step of "permanently
securing."" The district court found that claims were not enabled because the specification only
disclosed pulse soldering and moly-manganese brazing. However, the evidence showed that the
patentee actually used a six stage braze cycle that was "necessary to the enjoyment of the
invention."38 The Federal Circuit reversed the lack of enablement finding and stated:
If an invention pertains to an art where the results are predictable, e.g., mechanical as
opposed to chemical arts, a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single
embodiment and is not invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on another
embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed.3
Thus, Spectra-Physics tands for the proposition that in the predictable arts, disclosure of a single
embodiment is sufficient to enable a much broader claim that is not taught. That is true even if the
claim reads on embodiments that are inadequately disclosed.
In 1991, four years after Spectra-Physics, the Federal Circuit began reciting this rule without
limiting it to the predictable arts. In Engel Industries, Inc. v. Lockformer Co.,4" the primary issue was
whether the patentee properly disclosed the best mode. However, the decision also addressed
enablement. In one brief paragraph with no analysis, the Engel decision rejected the enablement
defense by reciting the following rule: "The enablement requirement is met if the description
enables any mode of making and using the claimed invention."41
Id. at 1562.
See e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,
108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
16 Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1533.
Id.
' 91d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Gould v. Mossinghofft 711 F.2d 396, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (labeling the
rule "settled")), see also In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522 (C.C.P.A.1944). In Spectra Physics, the Court upheld the district court's
invalidity finding on the alternative ground of failing to disclose the best mode. 827 F.2d at 1537. Arguably, this makes the
decision reversing the enablement finding dicta. However, the Court expressly discussed its decision on enablement as a holding.
Id at 1538. But see Pierre N. Leval,Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (2006) ("dictum
is not converted into holding by forceful utterance, or by preceding it with the words 'We hold that ... .
4 946 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
' Id. at 1533 (emphasis added) (citing Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). However,
Chemcast does not address the issue of whether disclosing a single embodiment can satisfy the enablement requirement.
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The technology in Engel resided in the predictable arts: connecting duct segments that
distribute air through buildings.2 However, unlike Spectra-Physics, Engel did not qualify the rule
recited above by suggesting that it only applied to the predictable arts. If Engel stood by itself, it
probably could be overlooked as a poorly considered outlier. However, numerous subsequent
Federal Circuit decisions have cited Engel for the rule quoted above.3 These decisions are even
found in the unpredictable arts.
For example, in Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs, Inc., the patents were in the field of molecular
biology, which is generally considered to be an unpredictable art. " The claims in suit covered
genetically engineered reverse transcriptase (RT) and were not limited by how the genes were
mutated.45 Defendant Clontech made at least one accused product by point mutation and argued
that the patents' common specification only described how to implement the invention using
deletion mutation.6 Since the claims encompassed point-mutated RT without disclosing that
method, Clontech argued that the claims were not enabled.4
After recognizing that, "[s]ection 112 requires that the patent specification enable 'those skilled
in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention,' 48 the Federal Circuit rejected
Clontech's enablement defense. The Federal Circuit repeated the district court's recitation of the
Engel rule, "[t]he enablement requirement is met if the description enables any mode of making
and using the claimed invention,"49 and explained that the patentee's "teaching regarding deletion
mutation is sufficient to satisfy its part of the patent bargain, as it fully teaches a mode of making
the claimed invention."0 The Federal Circuit even went so far as to suggest that Clontech's
enablement defense "might have [had] force had Invitrogen limited its claims to modified RT by
reference to point mutation."5' In other words, the specification might not enable one specific
embodiment (point mutation), but the broader claim is enabled because the specification taught
another embodiment (deletion mutation).
Invitrogen represents the furthest extension of Spectra-Physics. It is a relatively recent decision,
from 2005, in the unpredictable arts that finds the enablement requirement satisfied based on the
description of a single embodiment. The decision even suggests that other embodiments that fall
within the scope of the claim might not be enabled. Thus, Invitrogen represents a bright line rule,
not the nuanced multi-factor approach advanced by In re Wands. Finally, Invitrogen even mentions
that the full scope of the claim must be enabled, but interprets that requirement in much different
manner than the three recent decisions discussed in the next section.
Engel, 946 F.2d at 1529-30.
See e.g., CMFT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("T]he law makes clear that the specification need teach only one mode of making
and using a claimed composition." (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 160 (D. Mass.
2001))); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that "CellPro can carry its burden
only by showing that all of the disclosed alternative modes are insufficient to enable the claims, because '[t]he enablement
requirement is met if the description enables any mode of making and using the invention"').
429 F.3d 1052, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id at 1070.
46 Id. Apparently, Invitrogen disagreed with Clontech on the facts, but the Court never ruled on whether the specification
disclosed point mutation.
47 id
" Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
49 Id at 1071 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (citing Amgen Inc. v.
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III. EMPOWERING THE ENABLEMENT DEFENSE
In 2007 and 2008, the Federal Circuit issued three decisions that are at odds with Spectra-Physics,
Engel and Invitrogen: Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick. These cases made it
significantly easier for defendants to raise a lack of enablement defense. As discussed earlier, Wright
had characterized enablement as requiring a patent to teach the full scope of the claimed invention.
That had become part of the standard recitation of enablement, but the three recent enablement
decisions brought a new focus on the meaning of "full scope." They require that different
embodiments that fall within the scope of a claim all be enabled and, unlike Wands, Vaeck, and
Wright, they require it in the predictable arts.
52
A. 7he Prequel, AK Steel
Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick trace their doctrinal roots from In re Wright
via AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac.3 AK Steel is not controversial because its outcome is consistent with our
sense of justice. The claims at issue were found invalid because they covered subject matter that the
patentee expressly disclaimed.
In AK Steel, the inventors purported to describe a new way to make hot-dipped aluminum-
coated stainless teel.54 The inventors discovered that maintaining heated steel strips in a hydrogen
atmosphere before dipping them in aluminum allowed the aluminum to adhere or "wet" well on
the steel.55 The patent specification discussed the prior art as using aluminum coatings that
contained ten percent by weight silicon. It also explained that the invention did not work well with
this type of aluminum because it did not wet well. Despite this apparent disclaimer, the
independent claim at issue did not limit the type of aluminum coating metal used, and the
dependent claims stated that aluminum coating metal contained up to about ten percent by weight
silicon. 6 In a Judge Lourie opinion, the Federal Circuit found that a person of ordinary skill
would not have been enabled to make the claimed steel strip. Specifically, the decision concluded
that "the specification is inadequate as a matter of law in that regard primarily because it expressly
teaches against it. ""
AK Steel is not controversial because its outcome is intuitively correct. Claims that cover
material disclaimed in the specification should not be upheld. However, AK Steel's invalidity
finding should not have been based on the enablement requirement. The specification discussed
aluminum coatings that contain ten percent by weight silicon, albeit as the prior art. Thus, there
was a reasonable basis for concluding that the specification did enable a person of ordinary skill to
make the claimed steel strips using ten percent by weight silicon. The better basis for an invalidity
finding would have been 35 U.S.C. § 112 2 which requires that "[t]he specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention."8 Clearly, the applicant believed that its invention did not
12 Typically, mechanical and electrical technology are both classified as falling within the predictable arts while technology
involving chemical reactions and physiological activity fall within the unpredictable arts. See, e.g., Spectra-Physics, Inc. v.
Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). LiebelFlarsheim, Automotive
Technologies, and Sitrick concerned front loading fluid injectors, side impact sensors for cars, and integrating audio and video
images into preexisting content, respectively. The front loading fluid injector involved mechanical components. The side impact
sensor involved both mechanical and electrical components. The integration technology involved electrical components and
software.
344 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Aluminum-coated stainless steel resists corrosion and high temperature oxidation. Id. at 1236.
Id
16 Id. at 1237 (reciting independent claim 1 and dependent claims 3, 5 and 7).
" Id at 1244.
See, e.g., Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding claims invalid under § 112 1 2
because "a simple comparison of the claims with the specification" showed that the inventor did not regard the claims to be his
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include using aluminum coating metal containing ten percent by weight silicon because that
material did not wet well. Since AK Steel did not have to rely (and probably should not have relied)
on the enablement requirement to invalidate the claims at issue, it could have simply found that
claims did not reflect what the inventors regarded as their invention.
B. Liebel-Flarsheim
In Liebel-Flarsheim, the invention was a front-loading fluid injector system with a replaceable
syringe capable of withstanding high pressure for delivering a contrast agent to a patient.5 9 The
specification only described an injector with a pressure jacket but the asserted claims did not
mention the pressure jacket. As a result, the Court construed the claims to include an injector with
or without a pressure jacket.6"
th -r ... ci p-,- ur at 31
However, the breadth of the claim led to a lack of enablement finding. In anotherjudge Lourie
opinion, the Federal Circuit found that there was no enablement of a fluid injector without a
pressure jacket. Therefore, the specification failed to enable the full scope of the claim. The
decision focused on two facts. First, the specification only described an injector with a pressure
jacket and there was no guidance on how to make or use a system without a pressure jacket.6 The
specification even taught away from a pressurejacketless system by calling it "expensive and
therefore impractical" in the context of a disposable syringe.62 Second, the Court noted that "[t]he
inventors admitted that they tried unsuccessfully to produce a pressurejacketless ystem and that
such a system would have required more extensive experimentation and testing."63
The Court in Liebel-Flarsheim distinguished Spectra-Physics by arguing that the specification in
Spectra-Physics omehow enabled a person of skill in the art to make the invention as broadly as it
was claimed. It is unclear how the Court arrived at this conclusion. Spectra-Physics never discusses
whether a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the specification to make and use the
undisclosed six-step braze cycle without undue experimentation. Judge Lourie's characterization of
Spectra-Physics appears to attempt to reconcile his decision with previous case law, as opposed to
directly challenge it. This is somewhat surprising given that Judge Lourie also cited Engel without
invention); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing how § 112 1 2 has two
requirements: claims must set forth what the inventor regards as his invention and claims must be sufficiently definite).
'9 Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, 481 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
60 Id. at 1375. The claim construction was actually the subject of an earlier appeal. See Liebel-Flarshiem Co. v. Medrad
(Liebel 1), 358 F.3d 898, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Ironically, in Liebel I, the plaintiff successfully sought the broad claim construction
that resulted in a finding of lack of enablement in the appellate decision. Indeed, Judge Lourie seemed to take some delight in
the outcome by reciting the motto "beware of what one asks for." 481 F.3d at 1380.
61 LiebelFlarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1379.
62 Id.
63 Id
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any discussion.64 Recall that Engel also held that enabling a single embodiment satisfies the
enablement requirement.
Judge Lourie concluded that the facts of Liebel-Flarsheim were more analogous to AK Steel than
to Spectra-Physics.65 In both cases, the specifications taught away from subject matter covered by
those claims. If Liebel-Flarsheim and AK Steel stood for the proposition that a claim is invalid when
it covers subject matter disclaimed by the patentee, they would have been a footnote in the history
of enablement, special cases that lead to just results.66 However, Liebel-Flarsheim relied on AK Steel
for the proposition that "as part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant's
specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed
invention. "6 It is the focus on that phrase, "full scope," that allows Automotive Technologies and
Sitrick to extend the rule to claims that do more than simply cover disclaimed subject matter.
C. Automotive Technologies
In the next opinion, Automotive Technologies, Judge Lourie applied the full scope analysis more
generally. The invention was a new type of side impact sensor for use in vehicles. The prior art used
a crush sensor for sensing side impacts.68 The patented side impact sensor used a velocity-based
sensor which had the advantage of sensing an impact even when the side was not directly hit.
69
During the prosecution of the patent, the patentee explained that this feature was the "essential
concept of the invention" and called it a "breakthrough." 7
The specification provided a detailed description of how to make a mechanical side impact
sensor and included diagrams of several embodiments. It also noted that an electronic sensor could
be used, but only provided a conceptual diagram.7' The claims at issue were generic and not limited
to a mechanical velocity-based sensor. They also covered electronic velocity-based sensors. The
Federal Circuit once again found each claim at issue was invalid for failing to enable the full scope
of the claim.
In arriving at its decision, the Court focused on one embodiment that fell within the scope of
the claims-an electronic velocity-based sensor. The plaintiff, Automotive Technologies
International ("ATI") offered an expert declaration that explained why "one skilled in the art
would know how to adapt then-existing technology to create an electronic side impact sensor" and
stating "that electronic sensors were commercially available" and could be incorporated into the
claims.72 Although the case law has allowed a patentee to use the knowledge of a person of ordinary
skill in the art to help show enablement,73 Judge Lourie found that this knowledge was not
germane to the facts of the case. He reasoned that since "[t]he novel aspect of this invention is
using a velocity-type sensor for side impact sensing," it was insufficient to "merely state that known
64 Id.
61 Id. at 1380.
66 In light of the three recent enablement cases, Sean B. Seymore warns against disparaging an embodiment that falls within
the scope of the claim because these statements can suggest that the "disparaged embodiment was nonenabled at the time of
filing." See Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 Nw.J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 290-91 (2008).
6' LiebelFlarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1380 (citing AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (emphasis added
in Liebel Flarsheim).
6' Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc, 501 F.3d 1274, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
69 id.
"Id. at 1283.
71 Id. at 1278.
71 Id. at 1284.
73 See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("a specification need not disclose
what is well known in the art"); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("That is not to say that the
specification itself must necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the
artisan's knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and
perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art.").
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technologies can be used to create an electronic sensor.""4 The Court also rejected that declaration
as conclusory.7 But the Court's analysis suggests that a better supported declaration would not
have changed the outcome.
Interestingly, ATI's brief cited Invitrogen for the proposition that enabling one mode satisfies
the enablement requirement.6 However, the Automotive Technologies decision does not mention
Invitrogen, let alone distinguish it. Rather, Judge Lourie merely alludes to ATI's argument generally
and states that "we addressed and rejected a similar argument made in Liebel-Flarsheim."
77
In sum, Automotive Technologies demonstrates that the full scope requirement is not limited to
cases, like Liebel-Flarsheim and AK Steel, where the patentee has disclaimed subject matter that falls
within the scope of claim. Moreover, Automotive Technologies takes the rule one step further and
states that the patentee cannot rely on what a person of ordinary skill in the art would know to fill
in gaps when those gaps relate to the novel aspect of the invention.
D. Sitrick
In Sitrick the patents involved integrating a user's audio signal or visual image into a
preexisting video game or movie. The specifications described specific videogame signals and
disclosed how an Intercept Adapter Interface System would select, analyze, and identify characters.
7
1
The specifications also generally discussed how the same techniques would work for movies.7' The
asserted claims covered both video games and movies.80 Again, the Federal Circuit found that the
asserted claims were invalid for lack of enablement because the specification did not enable the full
scope of the claimed invention.
In arriving at its decision, the Federal Circuit noted that "[m]ovies do not have easily separable
character functions, as video games do" and the specification did not teach how to obtain those
functions from a movie. 81 Moreover, the defendants' expert explained the disclosed analysis
techniques were not applicable to movies."
Sitrick was authored by Judge Moore and it shows that Liebel-Flarsheim and Automotive
Technologies do not simply represent the personal views of Judge Lourie. Broad claims that are
supported by a description of only one embodiment are at risk. Indeed, the Sitrick decision said
that it did not even need to determine whether the specification was enabled with respect to video
games. If the claims were not enabled for movies as well, the broad claims were invalid.83
The three recent enablement cases (and AK Steel) take a fundamentally different approach than
the earlier enablement decisions. Although Liebel-Flarsheim and Automotive Technologies cited Wands,
they did not consider the Wands factors, much less discuss predictability.84 By the time it decided
Sitrick, the Court did not even mention Wands. Instead, in each of these cases, the Federal Circuit
recited the full scope rule, identified a non-enabled embodiment that fell within the scope of the
Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc, 501 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1284-85.
6 See Opening Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Automotive Technologies International, Inc. at 24, Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v.
BMW of N. Am., Inc , 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 2006-1013, 2006-1037).
"Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1285 (citations omitted).
" Sitrick v. Dreamworks, L.L.C., 516 F.3d 993, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
9 Id. at 997-98.
8Id at 1000.
Id (quoting Sitrick v. Dreamworks, L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97312, at "82-83 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2006)).
6 Id
SId.
8 The district courts in LiebelFlarsheim, and Automotive Technologies applied the Wands factors, but the Federal Circuit
decisions did not analyze them.Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, 481 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v.
BMW of N. Am., Inc, 501 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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claims, and concluded that the claims at issue were invalid. Interestingly, the embodiments that the
Federal Circuit relied upon were all mentioned in the specification of the patents at issue.
IV. THE SPLIT
Even before Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick, the Federal Circuit was split.
On the one hand, Spectra-Physics, Engel and Invitrogen stated that enabling any embodiment satisfies
the enablement requirement regardless of the breadth of the claims. Even those cases were
somewhat fractured, however, because Spectra-Physics limited the rule to the predictable arts while
Engel and Invitrogen did not.
On the other hand, under Wands, Vaeck, and Wright, describing a single embodiment might
not be sufficient to enable broad claims because those cases required a correspondingly more
detailed disclosure to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use or practice the
claimed invention. Enablement was evaluated based on a number of different factors, including
predictability. However, these decisions were all found in the unpredictable arts. Thus, even under
this line of cases, it was unclear whether disclosing a single embodiment would generally satisfy the
enablement requirement in the predictable arts. AK Steel suggested the answer was no, but that
decision dealt with a special case-claims covering subject matter that the patentee disclaimed.
Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick rely on the second line of cases and
demonstrate that in the predictable arts, disclosing a single embodiment will not automatically
satisfy the enablement requirement. Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick require
exploring the full scope of a claim and confirming that the specification enables everything found
within that scope.
A. An Odd Split
Unlike many other splits, this does not appear to be a situation where one set of judges favors
one theory and another set favors a second theory. If we examine the panels to determine which
judges were responsible for recent opinions that illustrate the conflict, we arrive at some surprising
results.
Below, the left-hand column lists three Federal Circuit decisions that state that reciting a single
embodiment satisfies the enablement requirement. The list omits Spectra-Physics because it was
decided in 1987 and only Judge Archer is still sitting on the bench. Johns Hopkins demonstrates the
strange split. Judge Lourie authored the opinion in Johns Hopkins, but he also appears to be the
primary proponent of the enablement standard advanced in the conflicting decisions. The right-
hand column lists the three recent Federal Circuit decisions that raise the enablement requirement
in the predictable arts.
Engel (1991) Liebel-Flarsheim (2007)
Judges Newman", Michel, Plager Judges Lourie*, Rader, Bryson
Johns Hopkins (1998) Automotive Technologies (2007)
Judges Lourie", Smith, Schall Judges Lourie", Rader, Prost
Invitrogen (2005) Sitrick (2008)
Judges Gajarsa*, Michel, Rader Judges Moore*, Michel, Rader
5 indicates the author of the opinion
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This table shows show that at least three judges-Judges Lourie, Michel, and Rader-have been
responsible for decisions on both sides of the split. Interestingly, there have been no dissents in any
of the cases listed above.
B. The Choices
As a threshold matter, the Federal Circuit needs to acknowledge that it has a split in its
decisions. Spectra-Physics, Engel, and Invitrogen cannot be reconciled with Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive
Technologies, and Sitrick. Once the Federal Circuit acknowledges the split, it will have the choice of
either following the new rule or taking a step back and selecting one of the older lines of cases. In
sum, the Court's choices are:
1. Follow Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick: enablement requires
examining the full scope of the claim to determine whether every embodiment that falls within
that scope is enabled. This rule applies regardless of whether the technology is classified as
predictable or unpredictable. This article will refer to this as the "full scope rule."
2. Follow Wands: the enablement requirement is evaluated by looking at number of factual
considerations, including predictability. Enabling a single embodiment does not necessarily satisfy
the enablement requirement. Nor does the patent have to enable every embodiment that falls
within the scope of the claim. This article will refer to this as the "Wands rule."
3. Follow Engel and Invitrogen: the enablement requirement is satisfied if any embodiment
is enabled. Again, this rule is not affected by the type of technology involved. This article refers to
this as the "single embodiment rule."
4. Follow Spectra-Physics: apply the "full scope rule" in the unpredictable arts and the
"single embodiment rule" in the predictable arts.85 This article refers to this as the "blended rule."
In practice, this is probably the rule that existed before the three recent enablement cases.
V. EVALUATING THE FULL SCOPE RULE
To evaluate the new full scope rule, we must first understand why the enablement requirement
exists. The enablement requirement ensures that an inventor is rewarded with a patent only if he or
she describes the invention in sufficient detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
make and use the invention.86 This serves two purposes. First, it ensures that an inventor actually
understands how to make and use the invention and does not simply possess the germ of an idea.8
Second, it ensures that the inventor fulfills his part of the bargain by teaching the public how to
practice the invention in exchange for a limited monopoly.88 However, the current analysis assumes
that the inventor has already satisfied these goals to some limited extent. In other words, by
enabling a single embodiment that falls within the scope of the patent's claims, the public is
" This rule should be flexible enough to account for the fact that some technology in the traditionally unpredictable arts
can be predictable and some technology in the traditionally predictable arts can be unpredictable.
86 "To insure adequate and full disclosure so that upon the expiration of the 17-year period 'the knowledge of the invention
enures [sic] to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use,' United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933), the patent laws require that the patent application shall include a full and clear
description of the invention and 'of the manner and process of making and using it' so that any person skilled in the art may
make and use the invention." Kezwanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112).
" Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does
not constitute enabling disclosure.").
- AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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assured that the inventor understands how to make and use at least one embodiment and has
taught the public to do the same.
The question then becomes how broad the inventor may make her claim.89 From an economic
perspective, an unduly narrow patent may allow competition to undermine the incentive to
innovate. However, unduly broad claims may stifle competition.0  Before Liebel-Flarsheim,
Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick, the FTC concluded that the "current disclosure doctrines"
satisfy these goals reasonably well.9' Specifically, with respect to enablement, the FTC endorsed a
standard that analyzes both undue experimentation and predictability:
When considerable experimentation is necessary, follow-on innovation is likely to be
costly; the more stringent enablement requirements that follow from greater need to
experiment reduce the breadth of the initial innovator's patent, and expand the rewards
potentially available to follow-on innovators. Similarly, less predictability makes follow-on
innovation more costly; again the more stringent enablement requirements that follow
reduce the breadth of the initial patent and provide opportunities for expanded follow-on
rewards.92
As discussed earlier, Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick are part of a growing
number of decisions that curtail patent holders rights. Obviously, courts should not take the anti-
patentee position on every doctrine simply because they perceive that patent holders' rights have
grown too strong. Courts still need to examine each doctrine to see if it is unfairly skewed in favor
of one side. The premise underlying Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick is that
claims in the predictable arts have become too broad and unfairly stifle competition. The
remainder of this article attempts to evaluate the full scope rule and determine how successfully it
can address this concern as well as whether the rule creates other problems.
A. Full Scope: Trap for the Unwary
The goal in Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick was undoubtedly to prevent
patentees from claiming their inventions too broadly. However, a good test for determining
whether the full scope rule satisfies this goal is to see how it separates valid claims from invalid
claims. These three recent decisions applied the full scope rule to the easiest fact pattern-
specifications that actually identify the non-enabled embodiment. In each of these decisions, the
specifications provided a detailed discussion of one embodiment but mentioned other possible
embodiments. In Liebel-Flarsheim, the "other" embodiment was a fluid injector without a pressure
jacket. In Automotive Technologies, it was an electronic sensor, and in Sitrick, it was movies.
Given that the claims were plainly drafted with the intent to cover these "other" embodiments,
it seems fair to insure that the patent specification actually teaches the public to make and use
them. This requirement does force the inventor to expend additional effort in providing a more
detailed description. If the inventor is required to fully enable only the embodiments identified in
the specification, however, the burden is limited because the task is discrete. Thus, applying the full
scope rule to other embodiments that are identified in the specification comports with notions of
fairness.93
89 See INNOVATION, supra note 1, at 20 ("Frequently, much will be learned and developed after an initial invention is made:
follow-on innovations will occur, and new uses will be found. The question then becomes, how many of these subsequent
developments ought to be ascribed to the initial inventor and made subject to his or her patent?").
9' See id at 23; Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29 (noting that overbroad patents can also discourage competition in the market for technologies that improve upon the
patented invention).
91 See INNOVATION, supra note 1, at 24. This statement described all three disclosure doctrines together: enablement, written
description, and best mode.
92 id
9' See Seymore, supra note 66, at 289 (suggesting that if a claim covers a range of distinct embodiments, "the written
description must sufficiently enable each of the 'distinctly different' embodiments").
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However, the rationale underlying the full scope rule suggests that it should apply beyond the
fact pattern illustrated by Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick. Thus, embodiments
not mentioned in the specification must also be enabled if they fall within the scope of the claim.
The goal of enabling everything that falls with the scope of a claim does not change depending on
whether additional embodiments are identified or not. To do otherwise would provide the perverse
incentive for patentees to avoid describing additional embodiments they wish to include within the
scope of their claims.94 But extending the full scope rule to these facts may create a trap for the
unwary. Patent prosecutors may not realize they are drafting claims that cover other embodiments.
Imagine if the patent in Automotive Technologies did not mention electronic sensors and the
claims in dispute generally covered sensors. Should the patentee in Automotive Technologies still be
required to narrow the claims to cover only mechanical sensors or otherwise have the claim
declared invalid for lack of enablement? What if the inventor/patent attorney did not even
consider electronic sensors? The full scope rule would still lead to an invalidity finding. Thus, the
unintended consequence of the full scope rule might be to invalidate claims that unwittingly cover
other non-enabled embodiments. Accordingly, patent attorneys must be extremely wary about
drafting overbroad claims.
B. Full Scope: Possible Litigation Abuse
Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick have opened the door for defendants in
patent litigation to seek some embodiments that fall within the scope of the claims in dispute but
that are not enabled. Assume that the patentee in Automotive Technologies had drafted the claim as
narrowly as the Court believed it should have. Instead of merely reciting a "side-impact sensor," the
hypothetical claim would recite a "mechanical side-impact sensor."
Under the full scope rule, this still may not have ended the inquiry. The specification actually
described at least three types of mechanical sensors that fell within the scope of the claim: a side
impact sensor containing (1) an integral molded hinge, (2) a simple spring mass, and (3) a viscously
damped disc sensor.95 A defendant could still raise an enablement defense by identifying a fourth
type of mechanical side impact sensor-say, a sensor based on measuring the change in air
pressure.96 Under the full scope rule, such a showing should invalidate the claim. This is true even
if a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the air pressure sensor was a
reasonable substitute for the three disclosed sensors. According to Automotive Technologies, a
patentee cannot use the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to fill in the novel aspect
of the patentV (i.e., an electronic sensor in the actual Automotive Technologies decision, or an air
pressure sensor in this hypothetical). If this truly were the rule, only extremely narrow claims that
directly reflect disclosed embodiments and their small variations would survive.
This result is at odds with how the law treats patent claims. Decisions discussing both
enablement and claim construction repeatedly state that an inventor is entitled to claims that are
broader than the embodiments disclosed in the specification. Cases from Fisher to Invitrogen state
that the enablement doctrine was never intended to limit claims to merely their disclosed
" The Federal Circuit has provided a similar incentive with respect to the doctrine of equivalents. Under the public
dedication rule announced in Johnson and Johnston Associates v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002), if a claim
does not literally cover subject matter disclosed in the specification, the patentee cannot rely on the doctrine of equivalents to
recapture that subject matter. This provides a similar incentive to be careful to claim all embodiments disclosed in the
specification or to avoid describing them altogether.
" These sensors are depicted in Figures 1, 5 and 6 of the patent at issue in Automotive Technologies, U.S. Patent No. 5,231,253
(filed Jun. 2, 1992). Figure 7 depicts a safing sensor that appears to be used in conjunction with one of the other sensors. See, e.g.,
'253 Patent col.ll 1.43, col.12 1.43 (claims 15 and 29, claiming the safing sensor with the primary sensor).
96 Although the air pressure sensor was made up for this hypothetical, the existence of alternative embodiments is not
farfetched. In fact, the inventors suggested that there are other possible embodiments using "other geometries, [or] materials . .
that would fall within the scope of the claims. '253 Patent col.10 1.53.
9' 501 F.3d at 1283 (holding that "[a]lthough the knowledge of one skilled in the art is indeed relevant, the novel aspect
must be enabled in the patent") (emphasis added).
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embodiments.98 This is particularly true when a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand how to make and use alternative embodiments.99 In Phillips v. AWH Corp. the Federal
Circuit discussed how it had "repeatedly" warned against interpreting claims to only cover the
specific embodiments described in the specification.' Moreover, the Court "expressly rejected the
contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be
construed as being limited to that embodiment."'
The author does not mean to suggest that the Federal Circuit actually would have invalidated
the claims in Automotive Technologies if they had been limited to mechanical sensors. That result
goes too far and no case to date suggests that the Federal Circuit would apply the new enablement
standard to such facts. However, the rules discussed in Automotive Technologies dictate that outcome.
At a minimum, the Automotive Technologies focus on the novel aspect of the invention must be
viewed with skepticism. Either the rule or its application proves too much. 2 It appears to make it
far too easy to invalidate a claim based on a non-disclosed alternative mbodiment. But even if the
"novel aspect" of the invention is ignored, the hypothetical shows how patent litigants can create
an enablement defense in almost any case.
The reason the full scope rule is subject to abuse in the predictable arts is because innovation
in those technologies is often incremental.3 Thus, in the Automotive Technologies example, experts
may differ on whether a sensor that measures the difference in air pressure is taught by simply
describing other types of mechanical sensors. Similarly, more complex technology inevitably
requires some effort to adapt new technology for a particular application. Attorneys will
characterize this effort as "undue experimentation."
We can examine the recent z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. lawsuit to illustrate this point.
The plaintiff, z4 Technologies, was the assignee of two patents directed at preventing the illicit
copying and unauthorized use of computer software.0 4 z4's invention controlled the number of
copies of authorized software by monitoring registration information and by requiring authorized
users to periodically update a password or authorization code provided by a password
administrator.' z4 accused the "Product Activation" feature in versions of Microsoft's Office and
Windows products of infringing z4's patents.6 A review of the district court' and Federal
Circuit 8 decisions indicates that the primary defenses to liability were non-infringement,
anticipation, and obviousness. Enablement was not mentioned in either decision.
98 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("It is apparent that such an inventor should be allowed to
dominate the future patentable inventions of others where those inventions were based in some way on his teachings. Such
improvements, while unobvious from his teachings, are will[sic] within his contribution, since the improvement was made
possible by his work."); see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Enablement does
not require the inventor to foresee every means of implementing an invention at pains of losing his patent franchise. Were it
otherwise, claimed inventions would not include improved modes of practicing those inventions. Such narrow patent rights
would rapidly become worthless as new modes of practicing the invention developed.").
99 See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
... See Phillips v. AWH, 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). Ironically, even Liebel I stated
that "this court has expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the
patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment." 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
101 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (citing Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. v. ITC, 383 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
102 The Court viewed the -novel aspect" of the invention as -using a velocity-type sensor for side impact sensing,' not as
the velocity-type sensor itself. Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc , 501 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, even
if the Court properly refused to allow a person of ordinary skill to fill in the "novel aspect" of the invention, the Court should
have considered the possible existence of velocity-based electronic sensors.
... In its 2003 report on innovation, the FTC noted that "technology developed in industries such as semiconductors,
computer hardware, and software can contain a large number of incremental innovations." INNOVATION, supra note 1, at 25-26.
104 z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
10 Id. at 1344.
106 Id. at 1345.
107 z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
l° z4 Techs., 507 F.3d at 1340.
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However, under the new full scope rule, Microsoft could have raised an enablement defense by
arguing that if its products fall within the scope of the claim, z4 was obligated to enable that
embodiment. At first blush, this may seem unreasonable. Preventing unauthorized copying appears
to be generally applicable to different software products. However, consider the evidence Microsoft
could offer. The patents' specifications never mention Office or Windows, much less explain how
to incorporate the invention into either product. 9 Microsoft's engineers could testify about the
engineering time it took to create the "product activation" feature. Experts could testify that
Microsoft's engineers needed to have an intimate knowledge of the workings of both Office and
Windows to add this feature. Why isn't this sufficient undue experimentation to render the claims
invalid for lack of enablement?
In response, z4 could correctly point out that the test for undue experimentation is not merely
quantitative, and that a considerable amount of routine experimentation is permissible."0
Nevertheless, doesn't Microsoft's argument create a factual dispute?"' If so, will juries believe that
Microsoft's engineering efforts are routine after an expert describes the effort in a manner
calculated to emphasize the complexity of the technology? In sum, the full scope rule appears to
allow defendants to raise the enablement defense in many cases where the defense is not warranted.
To add insult to injury, the rule incentivizes defendants to try to make the disputed technology
even more confusing, something that is far too easy to do in patent cases.
C. A Blunt Instrument for a Specific Problem
Another problem with the enablement defense is that it is a blunt instrument. Of course this
problem does not reside solely in the predictable arts. It applies regardless of technology. There are
at least two aspects to this issue. First, the enablement defense does not discriminate between
beneficiaries. Both defendants that practice an embodiment that is enabled by the specification and
those that do not can benefit from the enablement defense. Second, since enablement is assessed in
view of the state of the art on the filing date, the requirement is not well suited to address
overbroad claims that cover future innovations.
1. Non-discriminatory Beneficiaries
Again, Automotive Technologies can be used to illustrate the issue of non-discriminatory
beneficiaries. In the actual case, the defendants' side impact sensing systems used electronic
sensors''2 and they successfully argued that the claims were invalid because the specification
enabled only mechanical, and not electronic, sensors. In contrast, assume that some hypothetical
defendants used some form of a mechanical sensor. Even though the hypothetical defendants do
not use electronic sensors, there is no reason why they could not argue that the claims at issue were
invalid because they did not enable electronic sensors."' Such an outcome does not satisfy notions
of fairness in the same way that the actual facts of Automotive Technologies do."
4
109 See U.S. Patent No. 6,785,825 (filed May 31, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 6,044,471 (filed June 4, 1998).
110 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
111 Although enablement is a legal issue, it is based on underlying factual issues. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234,
1238 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
112 See Brief of Counterclaimant Defendant-Appellee Delphi Automotive Systems and Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee
General Motors Corp. at 17, Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc , 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 2006-1013,
2006-1037).
... See Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvannia, Inc. 256 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In Durel, the district court found that the only
question that the enablement defense raised was whether the plaintiffs patent enabled the accused process. The Federal Circuit
reversed, stating that the question of enablement "does not turn on whether the accused product is enabled" but whether the full
scope of the claimed invention was enabled. Id. at 1306.
114 This effect is somewhat ameliorated by dependent claims because defendants that practice something akin to the
embodiments described in the patent are more likely to infringe the narrower dependent claims. Indeed, dependent claims 6 and
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Applying the full scope rule to the actual facts of Automotive Technologies is more satisfying, in
part, because the plaintiff can be characterized as being greedy for claiming its invention too
broadly."5 However, our concept of fairness is reversed when we look at the hypothetical case.
Here, defendants that practice something similar to the preferred embodiment escape liability
because the claim happens to cover some unrelated embodiments. Not surprisingly, the defendants
in Liebel-Flarsheim, and Sitrick practice the non-enabled embodiments."6 In other words, all three
recent Federal Circuit cases applied the full scope rule in a manner that is consistent with our
notions of fairness.
Contrast this remedy with the results of a claim construction dispute. Typically, a plaintiff
argues that a claim should be interpreted broadly while the defendants argue that the claim should
be interpreted narrowly, usually in a manner that limits the claim to the disclosed
embodiment(s)."' This defense only benefits defendants who practice an embodiment that falls
outside the scope of the claim as defined. Similarly, if the enablement defense were narrowly
tailored to address the problem of overbroad claims, it would benefit only defendants who
practiced embodiments that were not enabled. But, that is not the case and the doctrine actually
aids undeserving beneficiaries.
2. Assessing Enablement from the Filing Date
The filing date rule also demonstrates why the enablement defense is not well suited for
directly addressing the problem of overly broad claims. Enablement is determined by looking at
the state of the art at the time the application was filed."8 "The law does not expect an applicant to
disclose knowledge invented or developed after the filing date. Such disclosure would be
impossible.""9  This rule furthers the purposes of ensuring that inventors understand their
invention and teach the public how to practice it.
However, the rule does a disservice to the goal of limiting the breadth of a claim. Returning to
Automotive Technologies, assume that the air pressure sensor was an innovation that was unknown
until after the filing date of the patent.20 If that were the case, a defendant could not rely on it to
argue that plaintiffs failed to enable the full scope of the claim.'2' However, if the air pressure
sensor was known by the filing date of the patent, it could serve to invalidate the claim. If the true
concern is that a claim is overbroad, the date the alternative embodiment was first known should
7 of the '253 patent in Automotive Technologies do not cover electronic sensors, but do cover the embodiment described in the
hypothetical. This suggests that the number of successful enablement defenses brought by such "unsympathetic" defendants may
be small because other narrower claims may be the primary focus of the litigation.
.. That appears to be what Judge Lourie believed when he concluded the LiebelFlarsheim decision with the warning,
"beware of what one asks for." Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
116 In LiebelFlarsheim, the defendant, Medrad, had a jacketless injector system. 481 F.3d at 1374. In Sitrick, the defendants
produced and distributed DVDs of various movies, some of which included the allegedly infringing product. Sitrick v.
Dreamworks L.L,C,, 516 F.3d 993, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
11 Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that the Federal Circuit
"has cautioned against interpreting a claim term in a way that excludes disclosed embodiments, when that term has multiple
ordinary meanings consistent with the intrinsic record").
11' In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06 (C.C.P.A. 1977). In Hogan, the Court distinguished "permissible application of later
knowledge about art-related facts existing on the filing date and the impermissible application of later knowledge about later art-
related facts ... which did not exist on the filing date." See also 5B DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04(4)(e)
(2005) (The enablement requirement "regulates the literal scope of the patent claim in view of the state of the art on the filing
date.").
119 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc. 363 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
120 That was not the situation in the actual case; the specification mentioned electronic sensors. Id. at 1278.
121 The filing date rule must be reconciled with cases that reject claims for the failure to enable potential future
embodiments. For example, in Wright, the Federal Circuit found several claims were not enabled because they broadly covered
an entire category of vaccines including vaccines against AIDS viruses that no one has been able to develop. In re Wright, 999
F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In practice, it appears that claims should be rejected if at the time the application zasfiled it was
clear that claim covered non-enabled potential future embodiments (i.e. claims that predict future innovations).
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not matter. The embodiment is either too far afield from the invention described in the patent
specification or it is not.
D. Recommendations
1. Backtrack
The Federal Circuit should stop focusing on the full scope of the claim. The use of the full
scope rule in Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive Technologies, and Sitrick suggests that if a defendant can
identify any non-enabled embodiment that falls within the scope of a claim, the claim should be
invalid. Defendants in the predictable arts will inevitably find some embodiment that satisfies that
criteria, and even if they do not, the courts will have to waste considerable resources weeding out
those defenses. Broad claims should require a correspondingly more detailed disclosure, but that
does not mean that every conceivable embodiment must be enabled.
Instead, the Federal Circuit should return to the Wands factors and consider: (1) the quantity
of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence
or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6)
the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
breadth of the claims. This test should apply to technologies in both the predictable and
unpredictable arts.
The Wands factors provide a flexible test that can respond to the different circumstances that
occur in the real world. Applying the Wands factors to the facts of Automotive Technologies and one
of its variations illustrates the flexibility of the test. In the actual ATI patent, the claim covered
electronic and mechanical sensors. That claim may still be invalid under Wands because of the
breadth of the claim and the fact that those skilled in the art may not be familiar with how to
make electronic sensors. However, a claim that simply covers mechanical based sensors would
probably be valid despite the possibility of a undisclosed mechanical air pressure sensor. The latter
claim is narrower and those skilled in the art are more likely to understand how to make other
types of mechanical sensors. Thus, the Wands factors provide a better basis for differentiating
between non-disclosed embodiments that should and should not invalidate a claim.
In returning to Wands, the Federal Circuit should overrule the Engel-Invitrogen single
embodiment rule. Although enabling a single embodiment may be sufficient to satisfy the
enablement requirement, here are plainly cases where such a disclosure would be insufficient.
Patentees should not be able to enable a simple embodiment and obtain claims that cover far more
complex embodiments that the patentee does not know how to make and use. Such claims
improperly implicate future developments but do not teach the invention. Interestingly, the facts
of Sitrick fall into this category. 122 There will undoubtedly be cases like Sitrick that disclose a single
embodiment in the preditable arts, but still claim too much.
The Federal Circuit should also overrule Spectra-Physics. Spectra-Physics goes too far by stating
that if a technology is predictable, a single embodiment is per se sufficient. The issue of whether a
technology falls within the predictable or unpredictable arts should play an important role in
determining whether the enablement requirement is satisfied, but Spectra-Physics' blended rule is too
inflexible. In contrast, the Wands factors are flexible enough to consider predictable innovations in
the unpredictable arts and vice versa.
122 In Sitrick, the patent could describe how to integrate a user's audio signal or visual image into preexisting video games
because video games have separate preexisting signals. The patent did not attempt to describe the more difficult problem of
obtaining those signals from movies which do not have separate preexisting signals. Yet, it claimed both the simple and the non-
enabled embodiment. Thus, even applying the Wands factors, the claims in Sitrick would probably be invalid.
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2. Consider Relying on Other Doctrines
Although a return to the Wands factors can play some role in limiting overbroad patents, the
enablement doctrine is not a good choice for addressing this problem. In one sense, the doctrine is
overbroad because it benefits undeserving parties-parties that actually practice enabled
embodiments. In another sense, the remedy is too narrow because it does not limit how broad
claims may be applied against unforeseeable future innovations. If the Federal Circuit feels the
need to address these shortcomings in enablement law, it should look to doctrines like claim
construction and the reverse doctrine of equivalents. They would be far better vehicles for limiting
the breadth of claims because they can directly attack the problem.
a. Claim Construction
For example, the Federal Circuit could consider what a patent enables as part of the claim
construction analysis. Currently, the doctrine of claim construction does not factor that into its
analysis.'23  The primary basis for construing claim is intrinsic evidence-specifically, the
specification, claims and prosecution history.'24 Interestingly, at least one non-precedential Federal
Circuit decision has used enablement analysis to inform its claim construction. In Medtronic
Navigation, Inc.. v. Brainlab Medizinische Computersysteme GMBH, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's narrow interpretation of a claim term, in part, because a broader interpretation
would have rendered the claim invalid for lack of enablement.25 By interpreting the claim in a
manner that preserved its validity, the Court indirectly relied on enablement analysis. However, the
Federal Circuit could directly incorporate that analysis into its claim construction principles.
Again, the advantage of this approach is that the remedy is narrowly tailored to address the
problem of overbroad claims.
b. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
The Federal Circuit could also revive the reverse doctrine of equivalents. In Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., the Supreme Court explained how the doctrine of
equivalents could be applied against a patentee (i.e. in reverse):
Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs
the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within
the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim
and defeat the patentee's action for infringement.
26
Evaluating whether a device is properly enabled may be one way of determining whether it is
so far changed in principle that it should not fall within the scope of the claim, and thereby trigger
the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Moreover, the "reverse doctrine of equivalents allows a court to
focus on what the appropriate scope of patent protection for an invention should be in light of
developments after the filing of the application of the patent. "1
27
However, the Federal Circuit appeared to announce the death of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents in Tate Access Floors Leasing, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc.:
Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse
doctrine of equivalents. And with good reason: when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112,
after the decision in Graver Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description,
12 Phillips v. AWH, 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("While we have acknowledged the maxim that claims
should be construed to preserve their validity, we have not applied that principle broadly, and we have certainly not endorsed a
regime in which validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction.").
124 Id. at 1317.
12 Medtronic Navigation Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Comput. GMBH, 222 F. App'x 952, 956-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(reasoning that the ambiguity should be "resolved in a manner that would preserve the patent's validity" even though the patent
contained a single sentence that referred to an alternate embodiment that would suggest a broader interpretation) (citing Phillips
415 F.3d at 1327)).
126 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950).
12 CHISUM, supra notel18.
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enablement, definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with the
broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. 128
Ironically, Tate concluded that the reverse doctrine of equivalents was replaced, in part, by the
enablement requirement. However, as discussed above, the reverse of doctrine of equivalents is a
better vehicle than the enablement requirement for addressing overbroad claims. Therefore, the
Federal Circuit may wish to revive the doctrine.'29
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the heightened enablement requirement represented by Liebel-Flarsheim, Automotive
Technologies and Sitrick may satisfy some sense of justice by penalizing plaintiffs trying to overreach
with broad claims, this Article concludes that the full scope rule does make sense in the predictable
arts. In the predictable arts, innovation is incremental, and the full scope rule allows defendants to
identify any embodiment and try to prove that the patent does not enable it. If this rule becomes
settled law, it will probably lead to litigation overuse, if not abuse, and make it difficult to draft
patents that do not run afoul of the enablement requirement.
This Article also concludes that the enablement requirement is not well suited for addressing
overbroad claims. It is a blunt instrument that aids defendants regardless of whether they practice
something that is close to the heart of the invention or something far afield. Moreover, because
enablement is determined from knowledge that existed at the patent's filing date, the doctrine
cannot weigh future developments in assessing the proper breadth of a claim. As a result, this
Article recommends that the Federal Circuit resolve the current split in enablement law and return
to the Wands factors. To the extent that the Federal Circuit believes that existing doctrines are
insufficient to address overbroad claims, it should consider modifying claim construction
principles or reviving the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
128 Tate Access Floors Leasing, Inc. v. Interface Arch'l Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
129 It is beyond the scope of this article to fully explore the pros and cons of incorporating enablement issues into claim
construction analysis and/or the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Rather, the author is simply suggesting that the enablement
defense is not the proper vehicle for addressing overbroad claims, and that there are other doctrines that may be worthy of
consideration.
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INTRODUCTION
1 Last fall, I presented a paper at a conference on neuroimaging and the law looking at the way
jurors were likely to construe neuroimaging evidence in insanity defense cases.' I tried to balance
jurors' likely positive response to the perceived characteristics of this evidence-vivid, objective,
quantifiable, advanced2-with their likely negative response to the use of this evidence in such cases
(reflecting their prejudice, hostility, and hatred toward insanity pleaders)3-and concluded that I was
"not at all sure that the pizzazz of neuroimaging testimony-not withstanding its colorfulness and its
propensity to reductionism-will trump these deep-seated attitudes."4 In short, I sought to make the
point that the science of neuroscience has to be assessed in the sociopolitical context of the specific
question of law that is central to the specific case before the court.
2 Again, as I stressed in my earlier article, the reality is that neuroimaging is fraught with
uncertainties,5 that the steps used in the production and presentation of neuroimaging evidence are
"[n]ot only not standardized, they are easily manipulated by a person with knowledge of the
* 0 2009, Michael L. Perlin, Professor of Law, Director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project, and
Director of the Online Mental Disability Law Program at New York Law School. The author wishes to thank Naomi Weinstein for
her (as always) superb research assistance, and Bob Weisberg and Ern Murphy for their thoughtful and helpful comments.
I See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged xiith Great Skill". Hon) Will Jurors Respond to Neuromaging Testimony in
Insany Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885 (2009).
2 Id. at 890. ("this language jumps off the page').
3 Seegenerally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994). See also, e.g., Michael L. Perlin,
"She Breaks Just I-ke a Little Girl". Neonaticde, The Insanif Defense, and the Irrelevance of "Ordinag Common Sense," 10 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 9 (2003) (discussing the stereotype of persons with mental illness as evil); Michael L. Perlin, "There Was an Evil
Messenger": Blame, Mental Illness, Wickedness, the Insanity Defense and the Pretexts of the Justice System (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Stanford Technology Law Review); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Sjmbolism Mthology oflnsaniy
Defense Jursprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 626 (1989-1990) ("[histoncally], mental illness was tied to notions of religion and
traditionally seen as God's punishment for sin').
4 Perlin, supra note 1 at 911.
' Alexandra Roberts, Eveything Nex is Old Again: Brain Fingeiprinting and En'dentiagy Analogy, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 234, 266
(2007).
Copyright C 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review. A/IlR'ghts Reserved.
technology."6  Some researchers characterize neuroimaging evidence as "indistinct."7 Amanda
Pustilnik, by way of example, concludes that "neuroscience cannot provide complete, or even
sufficient, explanations of criminal violence by reference primarily to purported neurobiological
dysfunctions within isolated parts of offenders' brains."8 Other scholars charge that "researchers,
clinicians, and lawyers are seduced into becoming true believers in the merits of [brain imaging] for
understanding the relationship between brain and behavior."9 Stacey Tovino argues that the fMRI
offers only "illusory accuracy and objectivity."'1 But what is clear is that the existence of neuroimaging
techniques has changed the contours of the playing field, and no matter which side of the divide we
find ourselves on, we must acknowledge that reality.
With this as backdrop, I turn to the topic that I have taken on for this article: what impact
neuroimaging evidence will have on a series of "criminal procedure situations," the resolutions of
which are inextricably intertwined with pre-existing socio-political views and attitudes of judges and
jurors: (1) the implications of Ake v. Oklahoma" (an indigent defendant's access to expert testimony)
in cases where neuroimaging tests might be critical; (2) the defendant's competency in consenting to
the imposition of a neuroimaging test or examination; and (3) the impact of medications-
specifically, antipsychotic medications-on a defendant's brain at the time that such a test is
performed. I hope that this article spurs some additional hard thinking about this topic.
The criminal procedure and evidence issues that I raise here have all been the subject of
extensive consideration in the scholarly literature and in litigated cases over the past three decades
(and, in different guises, all have reached the U.S. Supreme Court).2 All these issues, in these other
guises, are (or at least should be) familiar to scholars, practitioners and to judges. Yet each of these
"situations" is drastically underdiscussed in the neuroimaging literature and in the criminal procedure
literature. With the exceptions of one discussion in the law review literature, 3 one in the legal "cross-
over" literature4 and one in the psychiatric "cross-over" literature,5 there has been no consideration
at all of these issues in the context of the papers in this symposium: the admissibility of MRI and
related evidence in criminal trials.
This lack of attention is both surprising and not surprising. On one hand, it is surprising because
(1) these procedural and constitutional issues have, in a range of other topics, been the topic of
intense scrutiny and critique, 6 and the resolution of each, in their own way, has been seen as
potentially ultimately dispositive of the criminal case before the court,'7 and (2) intuitively, these
6 Donald R. Reeves et al., Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psjchiatu, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 90 (2003).
Timo Vloet et al., Structural and Functional MRI-Findings in Children and Adolescents nith Antisoaal Behavior, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
99, 99 (2008).
8 Amanda C. Pustinik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neurosaence i Criminal Lan 5, (Harvard Law School Faculty
Scholarship Series, Paper No. 14, 2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard/faculty/ papers/ 14/.
9 Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior Limitations i the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 289 (2007).
10 Stacey A. Tovmo, FIn ctional Neuomaging Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalfism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 479 (2006)
(quoting Martha J. Farah, Eme gi gEthcal Issues in Neurosence, 5 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 1123, 1127 (2002)).
1 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).
1 See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (discussed infra text accompanying note 102); Riggms v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
In his commentary on the live presentation of this paper, Bob Weisberg wisely noted the artificial divide that is present in
analyses of "criminal procedure questions" and "evidence questions." Robert Weisberg, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch.,
Commentary at the Stanford Technology Law Review Symposium: Neuroscience and the Courts (Feb. 27, 2009). I hope this article
helps to break down that divide.
13 See Henry Greely, Neurosaence and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibiy but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103 (2008).
14 See Jennifer Klflynych, The Regulation of MR Neuromaging Research: Disentangling the Gorkan Knot, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 295
(2007).
15 See Reeves, supra note 6.
16 See generally 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 3B (2d ed. 1998), and 4 MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, 9A-5.1 (2d ed. 2002).
17 Eg., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,77 ("[A] criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent
defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.').
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issues-access to independent testing, consent to testing, and impact of medical intervention (often
involuntagy intervention) on trial fairness-should all be "high cards" to those who take these issues
seriously.'8 On the other hand, it is not surprising, because (1) so much of the MRI debate is still so
focused on a series of what I elsewhere call "is-it-or-isn't-it questions"'19 (as to the hardness of the
science, as to the ease of juror comprehension, as to the evidence's potential heuristic power),20 that
it is inevitable that these admittedly less "sexy" issues have gotten almost no attention, and (2) so
much of the conversation about MRI has taken place at two ends of the spectrum: at the end of high
philosophy or the end of high science.21 The issues that I discuss here are, concededly, neither.
Rather, they deal with the "roll up your sleeves" aspects of criminal procedure, ones that may not, as
I have already indicated, have the pizzazz of either the science or the philosophy "takes." Still, in the
long run, they are every bit as important (and perhaps, in "real life," even more so).
I think that this lack of attention to the issues that I address in this article is, like "the dog that
didn't bark in the night" in the famous Sherlock Holmes story,22 even more important because of its
omission from the scholarly dialogue. As I noted a moment ago, these are important issues-in many
cases, dispositive-in criminal trials. I raise them here in an effort to bring new attention and focus to
them in the hopes that when this evidence becomes more commonplace (especially in what I call
"invisible" cases, those that are not the subject of intense publicity because of the nature of the
defendant or the victim),23 courts will regularly assess these issues in their pre-trial and "at trial"
decisions.
This article will proceed in the following manner. First, I will briefly restate some of my
conclusions from my earlier paper, discussing the tensions inherent in the ways that jurors construe
such evidence in insanity defense cases. Then, I will look at each of the three criminal procedure
issues at the core of my paper: the right to a neuroimaging expert, the standards of assessing consent
to the administration of neuroimaging testing, and the implications of administrating antipsychotic,
neuroleptic medication for a neuroimaging examiner's findings. Finally, I will offer some conclusions
and speculate on how our answers to these questions might bear on the larger
"picture"-neuroimaging-and-the-law.
My tide, as I expect many of you know, comes from Bob Dylan's anthemic masterpiece Masters of
War.24 The song is a "blistering indictment of war profiteers,"25 and as an indictment of the military-
industrial complex, it is as vibrant and angry today as it was when it was first recorded in 1963. The
lyric that I have chosen comes from this chilling verse: "Like Judas of old/You lie and deceive/A
world war can be won/You want me to believe/But I see through your eyes/And I see through your
brain/Like I see through the water/That runs down my drain."26 Its relevance to this topic should
become clear.
18 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, 'Equality, I Spoke That Word/As Ifa Weddng Vox"." Mental Disabilip Lan and Hon
We Treat Marginalk-ed Persons, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 9, 23-24 (2008/2009) (discussing the "high cards of mental disability law: the
balance between autonomy and social control, the extent to which a person in the community can still be subject to social control,
and the right of a person with a mental disability to refuse the imposition of antipsychotic medications.").
19 See Perlin, supra note 1, 915("Neuroinagmg is (or isn't) hard science. It is (or isn't) relatively easy for jurors to interpret. It
is (or isn't) immune to falsification efforts. It is (or isn't) objective. It will (or won't) lead jurors to 'better' verdicts in insanity cases.
It will (or won't) be used disproportionately in news-friendly cases. It will (or won't) 'trump' jurors' inherent suspicion of the
insanity defense.").
20 Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disablty Cases, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 39, 57 n.115 (1992) (Heuristics are "cognitive- simplifying devices that frequently lead to systematically erroneous decisions
through ignoring or misusing rationally useful information.").
21 See generaly Perlin, supra note 1 (discussing multiple approaches).
22 See SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver BlaZe, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 349 (1927).
23 See Perlin, supra note 1 895-898. (discussing use of neuromaging in cases of John Hinckley and Vincent Gigante).
24 BOB DYLAN, Masters of War, on THE FREEWHEELIN' BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records 1963).
2
5 
ROBERT SHELTON, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 155 (1997).
26 Bob Dylan: Masters of War, http: //www.bobdylan.com/ #/songs /masters-war (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
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I. THE AMBIGUITIES AND AMBIVALENCES OF NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE
Although commentators bravely assert that neuroscience seems "advanced enough to enter
forensic psychiatry,"27 that "[a]dvances in neurobiological research methods allow one to address the
nature and biological basis of human behavior,"2s and that jurors can be counted on to critically
evaluate such evidence,2 9 a cluster of other factors forces us to think seriously about how factfinders
will construe neuroimaging evidence. In a recent article, I identified these factors as "visualization,
reductionism, the attribution heuristic, and the impact of a belief in 'the CSI effect."' 30 Regarding
"visualization," I referred to the ways that the "visual allure"31 can "dazzl[e]" and "seduc[e]" jurors32
in ways that are "inappropriately persuasive."33 Regarding "reductionism," I referred to the ways that
neuroimaging testimony has the meretricious capacity to "[reduce] . . psychosocial complexity."34
By "the attribution heuristic," I referred to the way that we seek to attribute human behavior, in
the words of Laura JKhoshbin and Shahram JKhoshbin, "to a physical source in the head."35 And by
the "CSI effect," I referred to the way that we believe that jurors demand the "money shot" of hard
forensic evidence in all trials, even though valid and reliable evidence as to the reality of that belief "is
scant."
36
This remains, in the end, an area fraught with ambiguity and contradiction.3
II. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE QUESTIONS
A. Introduction
Concerns that (1) jurors may accept some scientific thinking uncritically, and (2) lawyers may not
be sufficiently adept at cross-examining certain sorts of expert witnesses are not new in the
evidence/trial practice scholarship.38 By raising the issues that are the focal point of this paper, I
hope to rearticulate these concerns in a new context: that of neuroimaging evidence.
27 Joachim Witzel et al., Neurophlosophical Perspectives of Neuromaging in Forensic Psychiatg{-Givig Wa to a Paradigm Shi?, 26
BEHAV. SCI. &L. 113, 115 (2008).
28 Jurgen Muller et al., Disturbed Prefrontal and Temtoral Brain Function During Emotion and Cognition Interaction in Criminal
Psychopathj, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 131 (2008).
29 Dov Fox, Brain Imaging and the Bill of Rights: Memog Detection Technologies and Amercan Crminal Justice, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 34,
36 (2008).
30 See Perlin, supra note 1 at 893-4.
31 Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Mind ng the Image: An Historical Iltroduction to Brain Imaging
and the Lax, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171, 182 (2007).
32 Id. at 183 n.98, 185; see also Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 9, at 289. See generaljy Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive
Allure of Neurosceence B planatons, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470 (2008).
33 Neil Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibhiy and Persuasiveness ofJMRT, 2 INT'L J.L CONTEXT 233,
247 (2006).
34 Id. at 248.
3s Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 31 at 171. On "heuristics" in general, see Perlin, supra note 20. But see Weisberg et al.,
supra note 32, at 476 (suggesting that the "seductive details effect" is a more likely explanation for juror behavior than use of
heuristic reasoning devices).
36 Donald Shelton et al., A Stud of Juror EBpectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the "CSI Effect" Exist?, 9
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331 (2006); see also, Wendy Brickell, Is It the CSI Effect or Do We Just Distrust Juries? 23 CRIM. JUST. 10
(Summer 2008).
37 For recent experimental research, concluding that neuroscience evidence led "novices" (non-experts) to judge "bad
explanations" of behavior more favorably, see Weisberg et al., supra note 32, at 475, urging that there are "more reasons for
caution" when applying such evidence to "social issues." Id. at 477.
38 Eg., Shar Seidman Diamond, Hon Jurors Deal With Expert Testimon and Hon Judges Can Help, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 47, 48 (2007);
Steven Wilkins, Knon Thine Expert: Expert Witnesses in Medical Ma6practce Cases: Supplementing Disclosure nith Online Investigation, 76 N.Y.
ST. B.A.J. 31 (2004).
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B. R ghit to an Expert
The vast majority of criminal defendants are indigent.3 9 Neuroimaging testing is expensive, and is
more expensive in cases in which the examined defendant is in jail awaiting trial.40 The question
before us here is relatively simple: does the defendant have a right to an independent neuroimaging
expert in either (1) insanity cases, or (2) other criminal trial matters, including, but not limited to,
incompetency to stand trial proceedings,41 sentencing hearings,42 and inquiries into mental status in
instances where the difference in gradations of a crime may be of great significance as a correlation
of exposure to a specific punishment?
43
Nearly twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of a defendant's
right to an expert in a criminal trial. In Ake v.Oklahoma, a death penalty case, the Supreme Court
ruled that an indigent criminal defendant who makes a threshold showing that insanity is likely to be
a significant factor at trial is constitutionally entitled to a psychiatrist's assistance.44 The Court
observed that it had "long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to bear on an
indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to insure that the defendant has a fair
opportunity to present his defense."45 This principle, grounded in the due process clause's guarantee
of "fundamental fairness," derives from the belief "that justice cannot be equal when, simply as a
result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake."
46
"Meaningful access to justice" is the theme of the relevant cases, the Court found,47 noting that
"mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary
process."48 A criminal trial is "fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent
defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of
an effective defense."
49
In determining whether access to a psychiatrist is one of the "basic tools of an adequate
defense,"50 the Court set out three relevant factors:
The first is the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State. The second is
the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is
the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not
provided... 51
The Court quickly disposed of the first prong, characterizing the private interest in accuracy of a
criminal proceeding as "almost uniquely compelling."5 2 In the same way, it summarily rejected the
39 Publicly financed counsel represented about 66% of Federal felony defendants m 1998 and 82% of felony defendants i
the 75 most populous counties m 1996. U.S. Department of justice, Bureau of justice Statistics Indigent Defense Statistics,
http://wwv.olp.usdol.gov/bjs/id.htm (last visited April 17, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Department of justice, Bureau of justice
Statistics, Two of Three Felony Defendants Represented by Pubhcly-Fmanced Counsel (Nov. 29, 2000),
http://www.olp.usdol.gov/bjs/pub/press/iddcpr.htm (last visited April 17, 2009).
40 For sample fee scales, see, for example, New Hampshire Insurance Department, NH Health Cost,
http://www.nhhealthcost.org/uninsuredWizardUserlnput.aspx?procedure =16&procedureName=MRI+- +Brain+ (outpatient) (last
visited April 17, 2009). See genera/f , Steve Silberman, Don't Even Think About Ling. Hox Brain Scans Are Reinventing the Scence of i-e
Detection, WIRED,Jan. 2006, at 147, available athttp://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.01/lymg.html.
41 See e.g., United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
42 This issue is discussed extensively in Greely, supra note 13.
43 See e.g., People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1992).
44 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985). Seegeneraljy 4 PERLIN, supranote 16, 9A-5.1, at 217-27.
4sAke, 470 U.S. at 76.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 77.
48 Id.
49 Id. While such a defendant does not have a right to all the assistance that a wealthier defendant might be able to purchase,
he is nonetheless entitled to "an adequate opportunity to present [his] claims fairly within the adversary system." Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
50 Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
5' Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (indigent's right to blood grouping tests in paternity action);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
s2Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
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argument that a reversal would "result in a staggering burden to the State,"5 3 noting that at least forty
states and the federal government already made such services available.5 4 The Court also found it
"difficult to identify any interest of the state, other than in its economy, that weighs against
recognition of this right."5 5 Finally, it considered the "pivotal role" psychiatry has come to play in
criminal proceedings,56 reflecting the "reality that when the State has made the defendant's mental
condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of
a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense."
57
The Court set out what it perceived as the role of the psychiatrist in such cases:
[P]sychiatrists gather facts, both through professional examination, interviews, and
elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the information gathered
and from it draw plausible conclusions about the defendant's mental condition, and about
the effects of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about the defendant's
mental condition might have affected his behavior at the time in question. They know the
probative questions to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their
answers. Unlike lay witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe might be
relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychiatrists can identify the "elusive and often
deceptive" symptoms of insanity, Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950), and tell the
jury why their observations are relevant. Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules,
psychiatrists can translate a medical diagnosis into language that will assist the trier of fact,
and therefore offer evidence in a form that has meaning for the task at hand. Through this
process of investigation, interpretation, and testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist lay jurors,
who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and educated
determination about the medical condition of the defendant at the time of the offense.
5 8
Because psychiatry is not an exact science, however, and because of frequent psychiatric
disagreement on the classification and diagnosis of mental illness and the likelihood of future
dangerousness, it is often necessary for juries to resolve differences in opinion.5 9 On such a
determination, "the testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and 'a virtual necessity if an insanity plea
is to have any chance of success.'"' 60 This finding led the Court "inexorably" to conclude that:
[W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues
relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present
testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses,
the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high. With such assistance,
the defendant is fairly able to present at least enough information to the jury, in a meaningful
manner, as to permit it to make a sensible determination.
61
As the risk of error from denial of such assistance is highest "when the defendant's mental
condition is seriously in question,"62 the defendant would thus qualify for such assistance when
he is able to make an "ex parte threshold showing that his sanity is likely to be a significant
factor in his defense."63 The Court thus held that, when a defendant is able to demonstrate that
53 Id.
s4 Id. at 79-80 & nn.4-6; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e) (2006).
55 Ake, 470 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
56 Id.
sl Id. at 80.
s5Ake, 470 U.S. at 80-81.
s9 Id. at 81.
60 Id. (quoting Martin R. Gardner, The Mth of the Impartial P2chiatnc EBper-Some Comments Concern g Criminal Responsibilities
and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 99, 113-14 (1976).
61 Ake, 470 U.S. at 82. On the ethical issues involved in the relationship between the lawyer and the mental health expert, see
W. Lawrence Fitch et al., LegalEthics and the Use of MentalHealth Eperts in Criminal Cases, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 105, 109-16 (1987).
62 Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
63 Id. at 82-83 ("It is in such cases that a defense may be devastated by the absence of a psychiatric examination and
testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a reasonable chance of success. In such a circumstance, where the
potential accuracy of the jury's determination is so dramatically enhanced, and where the interests of the individual and the State i
an accurate proceeding are substantial, the State's interest in its fisc must yield.") (footnote omitted).
On the question of what is a "significant factor," see, for example, Volanty v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989), cer.
denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989) (defendant's bare assertion that he was heroin addict insufficient basis for Ake appointment); Mendoza
v. Leapley, 5 F.3d 341 (8th Cir. 1993) (habeas corpus relief denied; failure to appoint expert psychologist did not deprive petitioner
of fair trial); Perkins v. State, 450 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (refusal to appoint psychiatrist at trial not error where psychiatrist
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his sanity was such a "significant factor," the state must "assure the defendant access to a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense."
6 4
Finally, the Court held that a defendant was similarly entitled to psychiatric expert assistance to
rebut the state's evidence of future dangerousness at the penalty phase of a death penalty trial.
6 5
Where the consequence of error is so great, the relevance so evident, and the burden to the state so
slim, due process requires "access to a psychiatric examination" for assistance in the preparation of
the sentencing phase.
66
The courts have generally read Ake narrowly, and have refused to require appointment of an
expert unless it is "absolutely essential to the defense."67 By way of examples, courts have split on
whether there is a right to an expert pychologist to perform psychological testing under Ake,68 and
have also, without citing Ake, rejected an application for the right to the appointment of a social
psychologist to aid in jury selection.6 9 Ake, on the other hand, was relied on so as to require the
appointment of a pathologist in a criminal case.70 On the perhaps-closer question of the requirement
of the appointment of a DNA expert, after an intermediate appellate court in Virginia relied on Ake
to require the appointment of such an expert, that decision was subsequently vacated, with no
discussion of Ake in the subsequent opinion.71
In his exhaustive survey article about the implementation of Ake, Professor Paul Giannelli points
out, in a slightly different context, that, "in 1985, the Ake Court could not have anticipated how the
advent of DNA evidence would revolutionize forensic science."72 Nor, of course, could it have
anticipated the new significance of neuroimaging evidence. To this point in time, however, lower
courts have been generally reluctant to extend Ake to requests for funding for neuroimaging tests.73
In Bates v. State,74 no Ake violation was found where a defendant sought additional expert assistance
in establishing functional organic brain damage, and in Smith v. Kearnej, there was no Ake error
where defendant sought funds for a PET scan.76 Although the court in Walker v. Oklahoma77 found
who had done pretrial evaluation of defendant concluded that he was sane).
64 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. The Court emphasized that this did not give the defendant the right to "choose a psychiatrist of his
personal liking." Id. Its concern was simply that an indigent defendant "have access to a competent psychiatrist." Id. Cf In re
Gannon, 301 A.2d 493 (N.J. Cry. Ct. 1973) (indigent in civil commitment case has no right "to shop around for a psychiatrist who
agrees with him"). See generaljy 1 PERLIN, supra note 16, 2B- 16.6
sAke, 470 U.S. at 83-84.
66 Id. at 84.
61 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 (6th ed. 2000); see also David A.
Harris, Ake Revisited" Epert Pschiatrc Witnesses Remain Beyond Reachfor the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REV. 763, 783 (1990) ("Lower courts
often have interpreted Ake less than generously, unduly constricting the availability of the right."); Comment, Nonpsychiatrc Expert
Assistance and the Requisite Shoning of Need- A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Crmial Jusice System, 37 EMORY L.J. 995 (1988) (arguing Ake
should be read to encompass nonpsychiatnc expert assistance).
68 Compare Jones v. State, 375 S.E.2d 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting defendant's request for additional psychological
evaluation; limiting Ake to psychiatrsts) and Hough v. State, 524 N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. 1988) (no right under Ake to appointment of
social psychologist to help in jury selection), wth Funk v. Commonwealth, 379 S.E.2d 371 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting
defendant's argument that psychiatric assistance is mandated under Ake; no error to appoint clinical psychologist), and King v. State,
877 S.W.2d 583 (Ark. 1994) (appointment of psychologist sufficient under state statute).
69 Wallace v. State, 553 N.E.2d 456 (Ind. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 948 (1991).
70 Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
1 See e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 331 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (state required to appoint DNA expert under Ake),
vacated, 462 S.E.2d 120 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (Ake issue not discussed), affd, 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154
(1997). For a more recent consideration of the application of Ake to DNA and other non-psychiatric evidence, see Paul Giannelli,
Ake v. Oklahoma- The Right to Epert Assistance in a Post -Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1418-19 (2004),
concluding that "Ake's rationale extends to nonpsychiatnc experts."
Beyond the scope of this paper is a related, important question: is neuroimagng evidence-for purposes of assessing validity
and reliability of testimony--more like DNA evidence or more like other more traditional forensic evidence (e.g., bitemarks, hair
comparisons, etc.). See e.g., Dawn McQuston-Surrett & Michael Saks, Commuicatg Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification
Sczences.Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (2008).
2 Giannelli, supra note 71, at 1418.
73 Jones is discussed in this context in Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuromagig Evidence: A High-Tech Cgstal Ball 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1254 (1997), and Mark Pettit, FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED.
319, 335 (2007).
For an array of recent post-Ake decisions, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, 9A-5.1, at 76-77 (2007 Cum. Supp.).
74 750 So. 2d 6, 16-17 (Fla. 1999).
7s No. 2 CA-SA 2008-0019, 2008 WL 2721155 (Anz. Ct. App. July 22, 2008).
76 Smith was a challenge based on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), arguing that the defendant's mental retardation
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that it was Ake error to fail to provide funds for additional neurological testing "to flesh out the
etiology of [the defendant's] mental illness,"78 it deemed that error harmless.79 On the other hand,
People v. Jone?0 did reverse a conviction because of the lower court's refusal to fund brain scans.
The constitutional analysis here cannot be undertaken without serious consideration of likely
juror response to the glitter of neuroimaging evidence, what Dean Mobbs has called the "Christmas
tree phenomenon"8' in writing about the seductiveness of this evidence.82 Certainly, this analysis argues
persuasively for an expansive reading of Ake and its progeny.
8 3
The need for this expansive reading is heightened because insanity defense cases are so often so
utterly dissonant with jurors' flawed "ordinary common sense" (OCS).84 How well can lawyers cross-
examine experts on these sophisticated questions of science where the"dazzle" of the proffered
evidence makes the expression of skepticism about such evidence equally dissonant from juror OCS?
Also, the neuroimaging-mental status cases (here, I am combining insanity and incompetency
cohorts) that have received the most attention were the subject of saturation publicity, such as
Hinckly and Gigante.85 This reflects the vividness heuristic, a cognitive-simplifying device through
which a "single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which
rational choices should be made," and further accentuates a mis-perception of reality.86 Until
neuroimaging evidence is used more frequently in what I have elsewhere called "invisible cases,"87
the distortion effect of famous cases will require our speculations to remain tentative.88
barred the imposition of the death penalty. The Court concluded on this issue:
Thus, while we do not dispute Thompson's testimony that frontal lobe damage can be a cause of mental
retardation, Smith has not demonstrated on the facts before us how a current PET scan would be useful in assessing the
pivotal question presented m this case--whether his mental functionmg was significantly more deficient thirty years ago
than today. Id, at *4.
77 167 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (10th Ci), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 987 (1999).
78 See Allen v. Mullin, 368 F 3d 1220, 1236 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing Walker).
79 Walker, 167 F. 3d at 1348-49.
80 620 N.Y.S. 2d 656, 657 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
11 See Neil Feigenson & Richard Sherwin, Thinking Beyond the Shown: Implicit Iferences i Evidence and Argument, 6 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 295, 299-300 (2007) (citing Dean Mobbs et al., Lan, Responsibili, and the Brain, 5 PLoS BIOLOGY 693
(2007)).
82 See also Richard Henson, What Can Functional Neuromaging Tell the Experimental Pschologst?, A58 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 193 (2005) ("There is a real danger that pictures of blobs on brains seduce one into thinking that we can now directly
observe psychological constructs."); Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 9, at 289. Cf. Robert Granacher, Commentag: Applcations of
Functional Neuroimaging to Civil Litigation of Mild Traumatic Brain Injuy, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 323, 323 (2008) ("The
overselling of [neuroimaging evidence] by lawyers is a serious potential evidentiary concern m... civil litigation.').
83 On the dangers of showing "undue deference" to expert witnesses, see, for example, Elaine Sutherland, Undue Deference to
Eperts Syndrome? 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 375 (2006). On the dangers of "anecdotal forensics," see, for example, David
Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology And OtherAbect Lessons from the Hisog of Scence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (2008).
Beyond the scope of this paper is a consideration of the implications of the Daubert doctrine on these questions. We do know,
however, that courts generally "lower the bar" on the resolution of Daubert issues in criminal cases. See e.g., Paul Giannelh, Forensic
Scence Under the Microscope, 34 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 315, 317 & n.22 (2008); see generaly, Deirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and CrImal
Epert Evidence Diferenti 43 TULSA L. REV. 381, 382-84 (2007). On the question addressed here, see James Menkangas, Commentay
Functional MRI Lie Detection, 36 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 499 (2008) (FMRI evidence, for purposes of he detection, does
not meet Daubert standards).
84 OCS is self-referential and non-reflective: "I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore
that's the way it is." In criminal procedure, by way of example, "OCS presupposes two self-evident truths: 1) everyone knows how
to assess an individual's behavior, and 2) everyone knows when to blame someone for doing wrong." Perlin, Neonaticde, supra note
3, at 8, quoting Michael L. Perlin, Psychodnamics and the Insanip Defense: Orinagy Common Sense and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 3, 22-33 (1990).
85 See also, e.g., United States v. Mezvmsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (multi-mlon dollar fraud case; defendant was
former Congressman); People v. Goldstein, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 2004), rev'd on otherground, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005)
(murder case in which victim was Kendra Webdale, after whom New York's assisted outpatient treatment law was named).
86 Michael L. Perlin, 'The Borderline Which Separated You From Me": The Insanib Defense, the Authoritarian Spint, the Fear of Faking
and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1417 (1997).
87 See Michael L. Perlin, A Lax of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2000) ("[IThe overwhelming number of cases
involving mental disability law issues are 'litigated' in pitch darkness. Involuntary civil commitment cases are routinely disposed of
in minutes behind closed courtroom doors.")
88On this phenomenon in the universe of czvlmental disability cases, see id. at 424-25 ("Civil cases are rarely the focus of so
much interest, but court decisions in a handful of cases involving potential professional hability-Tarasoff v. Regents of the Universioy of
California is, by far, the most famous-are disseminated widely to professional audiences. Their holdings-and concomitant
significance for practitioners -are regularly over-exaggerated and distorted.').
Beyond the scope of this paper is the interplay between the Supreme Court's pallid "effectiveness of counsel" standard set
out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the
adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result') and the responsibilities on counsel to
understand and contextuahze neuroimagng evidence. (My thanks to Em Murphy for raising this issue to me).
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C. Competency to Consent
The question of "competency" has been a core issue in the criminal law for hundreds of years.8 9
For most of this time, the focus has been solely on questions of competency to stand trial. In 1960
and 1966, the Supreme Court constitutionalized the prevailing common law standards in this area in
the context of both substantive and procedural due process, establishing a lenient test for assessing a
defendant's trial competency.90
More recently, the Court ruled-in what I think was a hopelessly misguided opinion91-that the
same minimalist standard articulated in Dusky v. United States as to matters of trial competency also
applied in inquiries regarding defendants' competency to plead guilty and/or to waive counsel.
92
However, in its most recent term, the Court backed off this position a bit, finding in Indiana v.
Edwards that the Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those who
are competent enough to stand trial but who are sufficiently ill to be incompetent to conduct trial
proceedings by themselves.93
Other courts have considered questions of criminal competency in a host of other pretrial
(confessions, search and seizures, line-ups), trial (jury waivers, evidentiary objections, impact of
incompetency finding on ability to enter insanity plea) and post-trial settings (motion for new trial,
sentencing, parole or probation hearing ), but these cases all seem to have been decided without
reference to or consideration of what other courts had decided in analogous (or even identical) areas
of the law.
94
The question of "competency" has also been a core issue in civil, constitutional and private
mental disability law,95 especially in the context of a patient's right to refuse the involuntary
imposition of antipsychotic medications.96 The Supreme Court has considered this issue directly in
three criminal cases involving different forensic populations (defendants who had been convicted of
crimes,97 those who were proffering the insanity defense at trial, 98 and those who were awaiting trial
on "serious" criminal offenses99) and indirectly in a civil case.'0 0 Multiple federal appellate courts and
state high courts have also weighed this issue, mostly in the civil context.'0'
On the criminal side of the ledger, the Supreme Court's most recent case, Sell v. United States, sets
out an elaborate formulation:
[f]he Constitution permits the government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs
to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially
unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account
89 4 PERLIN, stipra note 16, 9A-2.1 at 3 (doctrine traditionally traced to mid-seventeenth century England); But see RONALD
ROESCH & STEVEN GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 19 (1980) (suggesting its roots are in legal developments of the
thirteenth century).
90 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (test is whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and whether he has a "rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him."); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (conviction of mentally incompetent defendant violates due
process).
91 See Michael L. Perlin, "Digniy Was the First to Leave". Godinez v. Moran, Co/in Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentaljy Disabled
Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1996) (critiquing the use of a unitary standard in such cases).
92 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
93 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
94 Michael L. Perlin, Beyond Dusky & Gocinez." Competency Before andAfter Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 297, 309-10 (2003) ("The
failure of most of the cases to consider carefully the relevant precedents (and analogous developments in other jurisdictions) is ...
surprising.").
9s See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION
(2008).
962 PERLIN, stipra note 16, chapter 5B. See generaljy Michael L. Perlin, 'And Mj Best Friend, Mj Doctor Won't Even Say What It is
I've Got" The Role and Signf-cance of Counsel n Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005).
97 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
98 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
99 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
100 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
101 See 2 PERLIN, sup ra, note 16, 3B-7 to 7.2f.
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of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental
trial-related interests.
02
On the civil side, two models have emerged: the "expanded due process model" and the "limited
due process model." Under the expanded due process model, mental health patients are often
provided with procedural due process protections such as notice, counsel, the right to cross-examine
witnesses, the right to present evidence (including expert testimony), and the right to appeal. Under
the limited due process model, mental health patients are provided with only minimal due process
protections: narrower administrative review is provided, and broad readings of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause are rejected.
103
Analysis of the intersection between the right to refuse treatment and the criminal trial process
takes on even more importance when considered in the context of the findings by the MacArthur
Research Network that mental health patients are not always incompetent to make rational decisions
and are not inherently more incompetent than nonmentally ill medical patients.104 This research
suggests that a criminal defendant's autonomy in medication refusal decisionmaking should be more
privileged and less subordinated than it typically is.'
05
Mostly lost to the pages of history are the "barely remembered case[s]"'106 of Mackey v. Procunier07
and Knecht v. Gillman.' 0 These forerunner cases set the stage'0 9 for the civil and criminal cases just
discussed, but I think it is more important to think about them in the context of this inquiry.
Mackey and Knecht dealt with the use of medication as a tool of negative behavior
modification /operant conditioning purposes,"0 and also raised issues under the First and Eighth
Amendments."' I seek to resurrect these opinions here, because I think they may potentially
illuminate some of the issues we need to consider when we weigh what I see as a critical (but virtually
never discussed) criminal procedure question: what are the criteria for assessing whether a criminal
defendant is competent to consent to neuroimaging testing?"'
Although such tests are not physically invasive in the same way as injectible anttipsychotic
medication or nausea-inducing drugs,13 a strong parallel argument can be made, I think, that such
testing, involving measurement of brain functioning, is invasive for purposes of constitutional
analysis. It can lead-directly and inexorably-to negative outcomes for the person being tested, and,
as such, inevitably raises the substantive cluster of competency questions implicated by involuntary
102 Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
103 Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than "Dodging Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequag of Counsel, Questions of
Competence, andtheJuczalProcess m In vIualRght to Reuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 114, 122-23 (1996).
104 Perln, supra note 96, at 746-47 (discussing Thomas Gnsso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Studj.
III: Abihties of Patients to Consent o Psjchiatrc and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995)).
105 Grant Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343
(1995).
106 Michael L. Perlin, 'There's No Success like Falure/and Failure's No Success at All": Epos ng the Prete tuali7 of Kansas v.
Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1271 (1998). But see Greely, supra note 13, at 1110 (discussing Knecht and Mackey).
107 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
108 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
109 Thomas Hafemeister & John Petnla, Treating The Mentalfy Disordered Offender Society's Uncertain, Conflicted, And Changing
V'ens, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 731, 788-89 (1994).
110 See Bruce Wmick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Signicance of Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 534, 590 n.
230 (1995) (Knecht involved the use of apomorphme, a vomit-inducing drug, in a security hospital aversive conditioning program,
and Mackej, the use of succinylcholne, a paralyzing drug, in a California prison aversive conditioning program).
111 2 PERLIN, supranote 16, 3B-4.1 to 4.2, at 171-79.
112 Commentators have argued that, for certain purposes, neurolmaging tests may run afoul of the privilege against self-
incrimination and substantive due process. See, e.g., Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emergig Neurotechnologesfor Lie Deection
and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 371 (2007); Jody C. Barillare, As Its Ne t Witness, the State Calls... the Defendant.
Brain Firgeprnngg as Testrimoal" Under the Fifth Amendment, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 971, 1003 (2006); Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave
Nen World of Introgation Jurisprudence?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 341, 357 (2007); John New, If You Could Read My Mind, 29 J. LEGAL
MED. 179, 193-95 (2008).
On the possible application of the Fourth Amendment, compare id. at 195-98 (concluding that Amendment is mapphcable),
with Richard Boire, Searching the Brain: The Fourth Amendment Implcations of Brain-Based Deception Detection Deices, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS
62 (2005) (suggesting possible application of that Amendment).
113 On the relationship between these questions and the doctrine of Sctmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (discussing
physiological intrusivity and the criminal trial process, and finding extraction of blood sample constitutional), see Stoller & Wolpe,
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medication practices."1 We know that there is no unitary standard of competency15 and that the
body of case law and commentary that has evolved in criminal, mental disability and private civil law
is maddeningly inconsistent.116 I am not suggesting that I can resolve these multiple dilemmas in this
context; rather, I simply want to call our attention to this issue as one that must be "on the table" for
future discussions.
In a recent article, Jennifer bKulynych raises the important-but as of yet, rarely discussed-issue
of the need to determine whether a defendant is competent to consent to the administration of
neuroimaging tests,11 noting that there is currently "no federal regulatory bar to enrolling adults in an
MRI study."118 Robert Michels has also noted that the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
considers the present system for evaluating a patient's capacity to consent to dangerous treatment
"inadequate even to assess the capacity to consent to MRI for research purposes."119
The question of competency to consent to treatment and testing has become the focus of great
attention in the past thirty years.'2 0 As I have indicated, it is a question that the US Supreme Court
has considered several times in the context of the administration of antipsychotic medication in both
civil and criminal cases,'2' concluding that "a qualified right to refuse medication is located in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."'122 Yet there has been no reported litigation on this
specific issue that I raise here, although attention to it has been paid by leading bioethicists.2 3 It is
certainly reasonable to suggest that this is something we should be alert for in the coming years.
D. The Impact of Medication
Five years ago, in an article about brain imaging and the law, Dr. Donald Reeves and his
associates stressed that "psychotropic drugs affect functional imaging of the brain," and that the
effects of such drugs "are not always short-lived."'124 Given the fact that the Supreme Court, in
establishing the right-to-refuse-psychotropic-drug-treatment, has stressed that "the pervasiveness of
side effects is a key factor in the determination of the scope of the right,"' 25 it comes as a surprise
that this insight has not, as of yet, been discussed elsewhere in the legal literature.26 Again, especially
114 Cf Judy Iles & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethwcs Challenge Informed b& Genetics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5, 12 (2005)
("Even while neuroimaging cannot establish moral culpability... of where, when, or how a crime occurred, nor individual gmlt...
the constant stream of innovative scientific approaches is aimed at deriving biologic correlates for behaviors committed in the past
• .. is unrelenting. As we seek to understand responsibility of others through their biology, it is incumbent upon us to contemplate,
yet again, our own responsibilities in interpreting such information, and in protecting access and appropriate use.') On how the use
of neuroimaging evidence can compromise "cognitive liberty," see Boire, supra note 112, at 62-63.
115 Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disabilit Lax: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 673 (1993) (the search
for a single test is akin to a "search for the Holy Grail" (quoting Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competent7 to Consent o Treatment, 134
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977))); see also, PERLIN ET AL., supra note 95.
116 By way of example, courts routinely find mentally disabled women incompetent to engage in sexual intercourse (i.e., to
lack sufficient competence to engage knowingly and voluntarily in such behavior), but just as routinely find such individuals
competent to consent to give their children up for adoption. In one startling case, a court made both of these findings
simultaneously about the same woman. See Michael L. Perlin, HospitaliZed Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last
Frontier? 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC'L CHANGE 517, 538 (1993-94) (discussing research reported in Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different
Voice: Feminist Theou and Competence, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 763, 805 (1993)); State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 113-15 (Idaho 1990);
Michael L. Perlin, Competence to Have Sex (unpublished manuscript), at 37-38 (discussing State v. Ortega-Martmez, 881 P.2d 231, 237
(Wash. 1994) (holding, in statutory rape case involving a woman with a mental disability, that the complainant (whom the court
found incompetent to consent o having sex) was marred at the time)).
117 Kuilynych, supra note 14, at 312-13.
118 Id. at 313. Klilynych's work is characterized as "entirely persuasive" in George Annas, Imaginng a Nen Era of Neuroimaging
Neuroethics, andNeurolay, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 168 (2007).
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in cases that involve individuals institutionalized against their will in matters that involve the criminal
trial process, it is reasonable to predict that this will be the subject of important future consideration.
The final criminal procedure issue that I wish to discuss relates also-although from an entirely
different perspective-to a question involving antipsychotic medication: what substantive impacts
can that medication have on the findings of neuroimaging testing?'2 The answer to this question is
self-evidently critical to this entire area of law and policy, because of the alleged (or at least, perceived)
"objectivity" of such evidence, and its expected acceptance by jurors.28 If antipsychotic druggingaffects brain functioning-as it is supposed to do19-then neuroimaging tests performed on drugged
defendants need to be reconsidered.30 This is especially troubling, given the way that the use of
neuroimaging testimony "reduces the psychosocial complexities" of the matter before the court, and
"cconflate[s] representation with reality."'131 If the use of medication-involuntay medication-distorts
the "pretty pictures," jurors perceptions of "scientific reality" will be even more distorted.
I can identify at least three questions that need to be thought about in this context:
(1) Does such drugging distort the results of neuroimaging tests, as Professor Reeves suggests?
(2) If so, should such tests be performed at allon this cohort of defendants (or, should they only
be performed after a more elaborate form of informed consent is obtained)?
132
(3) In either case, what should jurors be told about this?133
Again, juror beliefs in the infallibility of neuroimaging34 has to be factored into any analysis of
the issues at hand. If jurors are inappropriately "seduced" by "Christmas tree phenomenon"
evidence, and the pictures that are shown are not an accurate depiction or representation of the
defendant's brain at the time of the alleged crime-but rather, depict it in the aftermath of forced
antipsychotic drugging-the entire enterprise becomes even more perilous.
CONCLUSION
The issues that I have discussed in the heart of this paper-access to experts, competence to
consent, and impact of antipsychotic medications-have all been the subject of intense academic and
clinical interest. The debate has not been without some vitriol. 35 Yet, again, there has been virtually
no consideration of these issues in the context of the type of testimony that is at the core of the
articles in this symposium.
Given the warning signals that have been raised by commentators as to the potentiality of juror
misuse and misinterpretation of neuroimaging testimony, it is, I think, all the more critical that we
take seriously the issues I have raised here. I have sought to argue in this paper that there are
121 The issue of mandatory treatment with antipsychotic drugs is raised in this context in Greely, supra note 13, at 1109-10.
128 See, e.g., Jessica Gurley & David Marcus, The Effects of Neurolmagng and Brain Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 85, 94 (2008) ("The neurolmages of readily apparent brain damage give the jurors tangible proof of the disorder.') (emphasis
added).
129 In re the Guardkanshop of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53-55 (Mass. 1981) (comparng the administration of psychotropic medications
to the use of electroconvulsive therapy, emphasizing the possible adverse side effects and potential effects on brain functioning
that are attendant o the use of psychotropic drugs) (discussed in Kathleen Knepper, The Importance ofEstabishing Competence in Cases
Involug the Involuntau Administration of Psjchotropic Mekcations, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 97, 134 n.141 (1996)). See generaly,
Katherine Brown & Ern Murphy, Falling Through the Cracks: The Quebec Mental Health Sjstem, 45 MCGILL L.J. 1037 (2000).
130 Beyond the scope of this paper is an inquiry as to whether there should be any difference in the law if the aim of the
drugging in question was based on the defendant's alleged dangerousness or the desire to restore him to competence to stand trial.
131 Feigenson & Sherwin, supra note 81, at 300.
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133 Cf Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130 (defendant argued that he had right to have jurors see him not under the influence of
antipsychotic medication in his "true mental state'). The Supreme Court, in a related area, has been unsympathetic to defendants'
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135 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Guthel, 'Rotting With Their Rights On".- Constitutional Theog and Clinical Reaitty in
Drug Refusal b' Pschiatrc Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979); Darold A. Treffert, Djing vith Their Rights On,
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landmines inevitably present when we think about the use of neuroimaging in criminal trials-
landmines that can infect the fairness of the trial process itself.
If an indigent criminal defendant is refused access to an independent expert in an area where
juror OCS136 may lead to uncritical acceptance of neuroimaging testimony (because of its visual
appeal and its apparent lack of falsifiability), the fairness of the entire trial remains, to me, in
question. If no attention is paid to the difficult and complex ethical issues that should surface if the
question of the defendant's competency to consent to being tested is not raised, trial fairness is a
concern. And finally, if we ignore the reality that the neuroimaging evidence shown to jurors may not
be an accurate depiction of the defendant's brain at the time of the offense-but rather, a depiction
of his brain at a later time when his brain biochemistry has been altered by the imposition of
medication-we willfully blind ourselves to the possibility (I might say "likelihood") that the data
presented to the jury is potentially fatally flawed.
Let me pause for a second to assure you that I am not a Luddite or a nihilist. Do not interpret
this as an anti-science screed, pining for the good-old-days of crime detection (perhaps based on
phrenology). That is not the image that I want to leave with you. Rather, I raise these issues because I
sense the power of the evidence in question, and because of my fears that its seductive dazzle may
hold jurors in thrall, leading to outcomes that are both factually and legally inaccurate and
constitutionally flawed. My hope is that a consideration of the issues that I am raising here will lead
all of us to think a little harder about the road ahead.
I end with a return to the Bob Dylan line that serves as my tide. Dylan angrily sneered at the
"Masters of War," telling us-accurately, I think, if the events of the last 45 years are to be
acknowledged-that he could tell what was realy going on in the minds of war-makers and war-
profiteers.'3 The line-"and I see through your brain"-is an ominous one, especially in the context
of the blood and death imagery that permeates the song. I use it here, because it seems to me that
uncritical acceptance of neuroimaging testimony in the criminal trial process will lead jurors to be/ieve
that they can do what Bob said he was able to do. The difference is this: Bob was right, and the
jurors are wrong.
136 See supra note 84.
137 BOB DYLAN, Masters of War, on THE FREEWHEELIN' BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records 1963) ("Let me ask you one
question/Is your money that good/Will it buy you forgiveness/Do you think that it could/I think you will find/When your death
takes its toll/All the money you made/Will never buy back your soul.").
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